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As building trustworthy (dependable) systems is one of the major challenges faced by 
software developers, dealing with various threats (such as errors, faults and failures) 
is becoming one of the main foci of software and system research and development. 
In the core of ensuring system dependability is acceptance of the fact that errors 
always happen in spite of all the efforts to eliminate faults in the system, its 
components and its environment. 
 
To this end, various fault tolerance mechanisms have been developed by researchers 
and used in industry. Unfortunately, more often than not these solutions ignore earlier 
development phases - most importantly, the architecture design - exclusively focusing 
on the implementation instead. This creates a dangerous gap between the requirement 
to build dependable (and fault tolerant) systems and the failure to deal with these 
issues until the implementation step. 
 
Software Architecture (SA) has been widely accepted as a way to achieve a better 
software quality while reducing the time and cost of production. It provides both a 
high-level behavioural abstraction of components and their interactions (connectors) 
and a description of the static structure of the system. While typical SA specifications 
model only the normal behaviour of the system, ignoring the abnormal ones (so that 
faults and errors the system will face may cause it to fail in unexpected ways), we 
have recently seen several approaches being developed which break the wrong 
pattern by specifically considering abnormal system behaviour and dealing with 
errors 
to prevent system failures. 
 
The aim of this paper is to survey the existing approaches to architecting fault tolerant 
systems, allowing its readers to gain better understanding of the state of the art 
research in this emerging area. This survey is built on developing a two-dimensional 
classification of the existing solutions: the first dimension is based on the traditional 
software engineering characteristics while the second one uses fault tolerance related 
parameters. The paper provides a joined unified view of the area, analyses the major 
trends and identifies possible directions for future research. 
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As building trustworthy (dependable) systems is one of the major challenges faced by software
developers, dealing with various threats (such as errors, faults and failures) is becoming one of
the main foci of software and system research and development. In the core of ensuring system
dependability is acceptance of the fact that errors always happen in spite of all the efforts to
eliminate faults in the system, its components and its environment.
To this end, various fault tolerance mechanisms have been developed by researchers and used
in industry. Unfortunately, more often than not these solutions ignore earlier development phases
- most importantly, the architecture design - exclusively focusing on the implementation instead.
This creates a dangerous gap between the requirement to build dependable (and fault tolerant)
systems and the failure to deal with these issues until the implementation step.
Software Architecture (SA) has been widely accepted as a way to achieve a better software
quality while reducing the time and cost of production. It provides both a high-level behavioural
abstraction of components and their interactions (connectors) and a description of the static
structure of the system. While typical SA specifications model only the normal behaviour of the
system, ignoring the abnormal ones (so that faults and errors the system will face may cause it to
fail in unexpected ways), we have recently seen several approaches being developed which break
the wrong pattern by specifically considering abnormal system behaviour and dealing with errors
to prevent system failures.
The aim of this paper is to survey the existing approaches to architecting fault tolerant systems,
allowing its readers to gain better understanding of the state of the art research in this emerging
area. This survey is built on developing a two-dimensional classification of the existing solutions:
the first dimension is based on the traditional software engineering characteristics while the second
one uses fault tolerance related parameters. The paper provides a joined unified view of the area,
analyses the major trends and identifies possible directions for future research.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.2 [SOFTWARE ENGINEERING]: ; D.2.11 [Software
Architectures]: ; D.4.5 [Reliability]: Fault-tolerance; D.2.5 [Testing and Debugging]: Error
handling and recovery
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Fault Tolerance, Software Architectures, Dependability
1. INTRODUCTION
It is hardly possible to agree against the need to incorporate fault-tolerance
means into software. Unfortunately, it is only recently that software engineering of
fault tolerant systems has become an active research area recognised by both con-
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tributing communities, software engineering and dependability (see, for example,
recent workshops on Architecting Dependable Systems [WADS workshops ] and
Engineering Fault Tolerant Systems [EFTS workshops ]). Traditionally, each of
these communities treated the other as something on the fringes. More often than
not, researchers and developers working on software engineering leave the issues
of dealing with faults until the very end of development, focusing on ensuring the
normative system behaviour. In a similar way, the developers of advanced fault
tolerance schemes have not been trying to offer solutions for engineering fault tol-
erance starting from the earlier development phases. Arguably, this has been one
of the reasons for a considerable number of failures caused by malfunctioning fault
tolerance means.
Let us consider the evidence:
—F. Cristian reported that up to two thirds of system failures field experience in
telephone switching systems used in the 80s were due to design faults in exception
handling or recovery algorithms [Cristian 1989];
—the failure of the Ariane 5 launcher was caused by improper handling of an
exception (including the handler reuse) [Lions 1996];
—the Interim Report on Causes of the August 14th 2003 Blackout in the US and
Canada clearly shows that the problem was mostly caused by badly designed fault
tolerance: poor diagnostics of faults, longer-than-estimated time for component
recovery, failure to involve all necessary components in recovery, inconsistent
system state after recovery, failures of alarm systems, etc. [Natural Resources,
Canada 2003];
—IBM researchers report typical patterns of exception handling misuse and abuse in
five customer and one proprietary J2EE applications, referring to them as ”bad
coding practice”. It was found, for example, that one in ten classes swallows
exceptions without doing anything about them [Reimer and Srinivasan 2003];
—the authors of an ICSE 2006 paper conducted an experiment that shows that in
a 10 million LOC real-time embedded control system, 2-3 bugs per 1 KLOS are
introduced through misused exception handling [Bruntink et al. 2006];
—another paper, recently presented at IVNET 2006, shows that in the eight .NET
assemblies (which represent the application, library and infrastructure levels),
over 90% of exceptions that the code can throw are not documented [Sacramento
et al. 2006].
While it is true that a plethora of fault tolerance mechanisms have been devel-
oped since the 70s, that there is a good understanding of the basic principles of
building fault tolerant software, and that a considerable fraction of requirements
analysis, run-time resources, development efforts and code are dedicated to ensur-
ing fault tolerance, we still cannot say that fault tolerance is always trustworthy. It
tends to be the least understood, documented or tested part of the system, which is
poorly designed, misused and left until too late in the development process, seldom
introduced in a systematic, disciplined or rigorous way, and often not suitable for
the specific situations in which it is applied. (In his famous paper on exception han-
dling [Cristian 1989] Flaviu Cristian draws this conclusion regarding the exception
handling code, but we believe this is true for fault tolerance in general).
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Recently, however, a number of studies have been conducted aiming to under-
stand where and how fault tolerance can be integrated in the software life-cycle
(e.g., [de Lemos and Romanovsky 2001; Rubira et al. 2005]). It has been recog-
nised that different classes of faults, errors and failures can be identified during
different phases of software development and therefore fault tolerance needs to be
addressed at different phases of the software process, such as requirements, high-
level (architectural) and low-level design.
The emerging area of research which focuses specifically on architecting fault
tolerant systems has, in the last few years, gained recognition by both academia
and industry. This is due to the fact that the introduction of fault tolerance at this
phase has the clear benefits of allowing developers to make good decisions, very
early into the process, about what redundant resources to use, how to use them
efficiently and to analyse if the chosen recovery strategy will be successful. Making
fault tolerance an explicit concern addressed during this phase, however, raises a
number of challenging issues which the researchers working on architecting fault
tolerant systems need to address. Some initial studies overviewing the state of the
art in this area are reported in [Gacek and de Lemos 2006].
We believe it is the right time to systematically analyse this area and to com-
pare and contrast the existing work. Coming as we do from different backgrounds
(software architecture and fault tolerance), we have found it extremely fruitful and
instructive to work together on this survey, trying to bring into it knowledge and
traditions from each of these domains. The core of this work is a two-dimensional
classification based on parameters which originate in both software architecture
and fault tolerance. The survey is set to achieve the two chief aims: first, to anal-
yse a carefully selected set of approaches using these parameters and, secondly, to
describe the major contributions and trends in terms of these parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. First, it provides a brief outline of the fault
tolerance and software architecture concepts in Section 2. The classification is
introduced in detail in Section 3 and applied to the surveyed papers in Section 4.
Section 5 provides the final analysis, summarising the lessons learned and outlining
the directions of future work in the area. Section 6 concludes the survey with a
brief summary.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Software Architecture
Software Architecture (SA) [Garlan 2001] is an autonomous discipline with the
originality of focusing on the overall organization of a large software system using
abstractions to express the logical coordination structure of complex distributed
systems. The emphasis in SA specification is in capturing the system structure
(i.e., the architecture topology) by identifying architectural components and con-
nectors and required system behaviour, designed to meet the system requirements
by specifying how components and connectors are intended to interact [Bernardo
and Inverardi 2003]. Even if there is not a unique perspective on what goes inside
a software architecture specification, components, connectors, channels, configura-
tions, interfaces, and ports are concepts common to most of the definitions.
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Properties and constraints can be attached to architectural elements or to the
overall system configuration. A coherent set of constraints and rules allow for the
definition of an architectural style.
To specify SAs, informal box-and-line notations have been replaced/complemented
by formal and rigorous Architecture Description Languages (ADLs) [Medvidovic
and Taylor 2000; Medvidovic et al. 2007] and by UML-based notations [Medvidovic
et al. 2002]. While UML-based notations for SA modeling are becoming of broad
application in industrial applications, domain specific ADLs are more frequently
utilized in specific domains (like consumer electronics and avionics).
Documenting a software architecture is not the only issue. Recently, much ef-
fort has been spent on analysing the selected architecture [Muccini and Vieira
2007] and on generating code out of the architectural specification. As far as con-
cern validation, testing, checking, deadlock detection, and performance analysis
techniques have been introduced to either assess the architectural conformance to
wanted requirements or to verify the final system conformance to architectural de-
cisions [QOSA Conferences ; WADS workshops ; Muccini and Vieira 2007]. Once
the SA quality and dependability is assured, it can be used to generate (skeletal)
code, employing (semi-) automated processes [ArchJava ; Fujaba ]. In such a gen-
erative scenario, being able to model only normal behaviours of the system, makes
the architecture-based code generation process producing a system implementation
unable to tolerate faults. As a consequence, the system may fail in unexpected
ways due to some faults.
SA descriptions have been also integrated in industrial software development
processes, as shown in [Hofmeister et al. 1998; Bass et al. 2003] and tools have been
proposed in order to make specification and analysis rigorous.
2.2 Fault Tolerance
Four general means can be employed to attain dependability [Avizienis et al. 2004]:
fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting. Clearly in
practice one needs to apply a combination of all of these means to ensure the
required dependability level. All these activities are centred around the concept of
faults. In our survey we follow the dependability terminology from [Avizienis et al.
2004] which introduces the following causal chain of dependability threats. It is
said that the system failure to deliver its service is caused by an erroneous system
state, which, in its turn, is caused by a triggered fault. That means that faults can
be silent for some time and that their triggering (activation) does not necessarily
cause immediate failure. Errors are typically latent and the aim of fault tolerance
is to detect them and deal with them before they make systems fail.
In this survey we focus on fault tolerance means that are used to avoid service
failures in the presence of faults. The essence of fault tolerance is in detecting errors
and carrying the following system recovery. Generally speaking, during system
recovery one needs to conduct two steps: error handling and fault handing.
Error handling can be done in one of the following three ways: backward er-
ror recovery (sometimes called rollback), forward error recovery (sometimes called
rollforward) or compensation. Backward error recovery returns the system into a
previous (assumed to be correct) state; the typical techniques are checkpoints, re-
covery points, backup, restart, transaction abort etc. Forward error recovery moves
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the system into a new correct state; this type of recovery is typically carried out by
employing exception handling techniques (found in many programming languages,
such as Ada, Java, C++, etc.). There have been considerable amount of work
on defining exception handling mechanisms suitable for different domains, develop-
ment and modelling paradigms, types of faults, execution environments, etc. (see,
for example, [Perry et al. 2000]). It is worth noting here that, generally speaking,
forward error recovery is more general than backward error recovery. To conduct
compensation one needs to ensure that the system contains enough redundancy
to mask errors by adjudicating the execution results and system states. Various
replication and diversity techniques fall into this category. A wide range of soft-
ware diversity mechanisms, including recovery blocks [Randell 1975] and N-version
programming (NVP) [Avizienis 1985], has been developed and successfully used in
industry.
The fault handling activity has a very different nature as it intends to rid the
system from faults to avoid new errors they may cause in the later execution. It
starts with fault diagnostics, followed by isolation of the faulty component and sys-
tem reconfiguration. After that the system typically needs to be reinitialized to
continue its execution. Fault handling is usually much more expensive than error
handling.
An area of a particular interest to this survey is development of the atomic action
mechanisms used for handling exceptions in systems in which components cooperate
– forward and backward error recovery in these system relies on cooperative excep-
tion handling which involves several components. The first scheme [Campbell and
Randell 1986] introduced recursive system structuring using nested atomic actions
and resolution of the exceptions concurrently raised in an action. The follow-up
work on Coordinated Atomic actions (CA actions) [Xu et al. 1995] extended this
scheme to allow dealing with resources shared (or, competed for) by several actions
using the mechanisms of the ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability)
transactions [Lynch et al. 1994] and to explicitly support action abort as one of the
possible exceptional outcomes.
Another relevant work [Lee and Anderson 1990] introduced the concept of the
idealized fault tolerant component as a general blueprint for building components
with well-defined fault tolerance (exceptional) interfaces and clearly separated fault
tolerance component behaviour.
The choice of the specific error detection, error handling and fault handling tech-
niques to be used for a particular system is directly related to and depends upon
the underlying fault assumptions. For example, replication techniques are typically
used to tolerate hardware faults, whereas software diversity is employed to deal
with software design bugs.
3. THE CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK
The classification framework proposed in this paper permits to compare state-
of-the art proposals for handling fault tolerance at the software architecture level.
Being this survey serving two different and usually loosely related communities
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(i.e., the software architecture and the fault tolerance ones), the classification frame-
work here proposed takes into consideration two main viewpoints: the perspective
of a software architect, which is interested to model fault tolerance concepts at the
architectural level, and wants to learn how to architect a fault tolerant system; the
perspective of a fault tolerance specialist, which wants to learn how traditional low-
level fault tolerance techniques can be applied at the architectural level. Based on
those two viewpoints, the classification framework is built around two categories of
parameters: (i) parameters from an architectural view point, and (ii) parameters
from a fault tolerance view point.
The framework provides two separate sets of parameters, covering the architec-
tural and fault tolerance viewpoints, respectively. The choice of using the two
separate classifications is driven by the fact that the two communities have dif-
ferent vocabularies, expertise, domain specific knowledge, and ontologies; so that
the survey is intended to provide a useful reference framework for both commu-
nities, without requiring specialised knowledge in both domains. While keeping
the two sets of parameters separate may seem not the natural choice, our work
on the survey convinced us that this is a useful approach as it captures the char-
acteristics which are non-overlapping and orthogonal. The domain of architecting
fault tolerant systems is an emerging area, it is only natural that it heavily relies
on the concepts inherited from its ancestors. The two sets of characteristics offer
a powerful common language which can be understood by researchers from both
communities. Its important characteristics is an explicit support for expressing two
sets of requirements (the software architectural and fault tolerance ones) and for
developing architectural level solutions meeting them.
3.1 Classification Parameters from a Software Architecture view point
As outlined in Section 2.1, a software architecture specifies the high-level struc-
ture and behaviour of interacting components. Research on software architecture
mainly investigates which are the main architectural concepts to be included in a
software architecture, how to model an architecture, how the architectural spec-
ification can be used for analysis and coding purposes, architectural styles and
architecture-based software processes. The first set of parameters we propose ana-
lyzes how the existing approaches for architecting fault tolerant systems cover the
main core concepts in software architecture. The selected software architecture
parameters are those described below and graphically illustrated in Figure 1:
—SA Concepts: as outlined in Section 2.1, a software architecture is represented by
the assembly of components through connectors and channels, in order to create
an architectural configuration satisfying certain quality requirements.
The classification framework will show how the surveyed approaches consider con-
stituent architectural elements typically available in normal architectures when
dealing with fault tolerant (FT) SA. It will focus on the main concepts of components,
connectors and channels, configuration, and interfaces.
—SA Specification: as thoroughly discussed in many papers (e.g., [Medvidovic and
Taylor 2000; Medvidovic et al. 2002; Garlan 2003]) a software architecture can be
specified through box-and-line notations, through formal architecture description
Technical Report
Architecting Fault Tolerant Systems · 7
SA Specification:
How the FT SA is specified
Software Architecture view point
FT Software Process:
How the FT software process drives
the production of a FT software system
Formal ADL Specification
UML specification/MDA
Testing
Consistency
checking
Dynamic
Reconfiguration Behavioral Specification
Analysis:
How the FT SA is used for
analysis purposes
Coding:
How the FT SA is used for
coding the fault tolerant system
Specification and Coding:
How the FT SA is used for both
modeling and coding purposes
Specification and Analysis:
How the FT SA is used for both
modeling and analysis purposes
FT Style:
How the FT SA is constrained by
certain architectural FT styles
Tool Support:
How the FT SA is supported
by automated tools SA concepts:
How the FT SA makes use
of architectural concepts
Components
Connectors &
channels
Configurations
Interfaces
Run-time FT:
How the FT SA is supported at
Run-Time
Performance
Others
Fig. 1. Software Architecture viewpoint
languages (ADL) and via UML-based notations. Moreover, a software architec-
ture can be specified through different view points [Hofmeister et al. 1998; Bass
et al. 2003], e.g., structure, behaviour, architectural requirements, deployment.
The classification framework will identify which kind of notation is used when
specifying the FT SA (i.e., formal or model-based) and which view point is
provided (i.e., structural or behavioural)1.
—Analysis: software architecture are designed in order to meet some quality re-
quirements, and analysis techniques allow software engineers to assess the soft-
ware architecture and to evaluate its quality with respect to expected require-
ments. In this direction, deadlock, testing, checking, simulation, performance,
and many other analysis have been proposed at the software architecture level.
1please notice that the structural view point is not explicitly analysed since available in any FT
SA approach
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The classification framework here proposed will mainly focus on how existing FT
SA proposals have dealt with consistency checking, testing, and performance.
A field named others will be used for other analysis techniques sporadically used
in some of the surveyed approaches.
—Coding: a software architecture usually acts a bridge from the requirement phase
down to the system implementation. As soon as the architectural model complies
to certain quality expectations, it can be used for generating (or at least, driving)
the system implementation.
The classification framework will identify those approaches which allow some sort
of code generation starting from FT SA specifications.
—Run-Time: traditionally, software architectures have been specified as unchange-
able artifacts. Recently, instead, the focus is moving to dynamically evolving ar-
chitectures, capable of adapting during the system execution (e.g., self-adaptive,
self-repairing, and service oriented architectures).
The framework will analyse how current proposals for FT SA consider changing
over time and adaptable architectures.
—FT Software Process: software architecture is an important phase in a typical
software engineering development process, which needs to be strongly connected
to requirements, low-level design and coding.
The framework will highlight how FT SA models presented in the surveyed papers
are integrated in a more generic FT software development process.
—FT Style: according to [Shaw and Clements 1997], an architectural style is “a set
of design rules that identify the kinds of components and connectors that may be
used to compose a system or subsystem, together with local or global constraints on
the way the composition is done”. Many architectural styles have been discussed
in the past: client-server, pipe-and-filter, layered, blackboard, C2, and others.
The framework will identify and discuss new architectural styles introduced for
dealing with FT SAs.
—Tool Support: tool support for modeling, analyzing, and coding software archi-
tectures is the natural way to go for bridging the gap between academic research
and industrial practice.
The framework will identify those tools made available by the surveyed ap-
proaches, enabling the automated support for modeling, analysing and coding
FT SA.
3.2 Classification Parameters from the Fault Tolerance view point
This section defines a set of fault tolerance parameters used for classification and
comparison of the existing approaches. All solutions of interest are explicitly dealing
with the faults and/or errors by applying specialised fault tolerance mechanisms
at the architectural level. These techniques are to be applied by the architects as
part of system development. The choice of the solution depends on the types of
faults which can and need to be represented at the architectural level, on the fault
tolerance requirements and on the redundant resources which are reasoned about
during architectural design. In the following we introduce the set of fault tolerance
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parameters and the considerations supporting their choice. Figure 2 graphically
summarizes the selected fault tolerance view point parameters.
Fault Tolerance view point
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Fig. 2. The Fault Tolerance viewpoint Classification
—Fault assumptions. A clear statement of fault assumptions is in the core of fault
tolerance as they define both the faults to be tolerated by a specific fault tolerance
mechanism and the faults which can never happen during system execution. The
latter includes the execution of the fault tolerance mechanism and as such defines
the foundation on which the mechanism is built. Fault assumptions are crucial
in choosing the fault tolerance mechanism to apply. Typical examples of fault
assumptions are hardware faults, software design faults, environmental
faults, operator mistakes, and interaction faults.
In the context of this survey fault assumptions define the types of faults the
architectural solution proposed intends to tolerate. These assumptions are typ-
ically expressed in terms of the architectural level at which we reason about
the systems, i.e. in terms of components, connectors and configurations (e.g.
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failures of the individual components and connectors, architectural component
mismatches).
—Origins of the software architecture solution. Development of various fault toler-
ance techniques at the design and implementation levels has been traditionally
an active area of research starting from mid 60s.
All fault tolerance techniques developed for the software architecture level orig-
inate from these known techniques. We will position each of the architectural
solution in the context of the original fault tolerance techniques, such as software
diversity (N-version programming and recovery blocks), exception handling
(Idealized FT component model and Coordinated Atomic actions), replication,
and etc.
—Steps of the fault tolerance. The three general steps of fault tolerance which each
fault tolerance approach can provide are error detection, error handling,
and fault handling (see Section 2.2).
Each architectural approach discussed in the survey supports techniques of one
or more of these types. We will describe each of them in these terms.
—Error detection. Fault tolerance always starts with detecting erroneous condi-
tions.
When the discussed architectural solution provides error detection, we will de-
fine where at the architectural level errors are detected, by which architectural
elements and how error detection is conducted.
—Error handling type. There are three general types of error handling: forward
error recovery, backward error recovery, or compensation.
When the architectural approach proposed provides error handling we will explain
which type of error handling it implements.
—Fault handling type. This parameter defines the way the mechanism proposed
intends to rid the system from the faults.
The most typical approach to doing this at the architectural level is by reconfig-
uring the system, e.g. by removing or replacing the faulty architectural element.
—Exception handling. Forward error recovery is typically implemented at the ap-
plication level using appropriate exception handling mechanisms. Exception han-
dling is the most general and effective approach to recovering from errors.
When the architectural approach proposed employs forward error recovery we
will analyse it using the specific parameters developed for comparing exception
handling mechanisms at the architectural level. These parameters have been de-
fined using our previous work on classification of exception handing mechanisms
in programming [Garcia et al. 2001] and include descriptions of (i) where the
exceptions are defined (e.g. the component interfaces, configuration), (ii) what
the exception handlers are, (iii) where the handlers are attached, (iv) how ex-
ceptions are propagated, (v) which continuation model is used (resumption or
termination), (vi) how the approach deals with concurrent exceptions, and (vii)
what are the exception handling scopes.
—Error confinement and recovery domain. Clear understanding of the domain
of the overall system state which can be affected by an error is crucial for the
success of recovery. Some fault tolerance solutions clearly define such domains
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and ensure error confinement. Whereas others rely on a set of assumptions or
impose a set of rules for the programmers to follow to guarantee that errors are
always contained.
We will clearly identify the error confinement and recovery domain for each ap-
proach surveyed, this will be done in the software architecture terms. Some of the
examples of the structuring units of error confinement and error recovery are a
component, an action involving several cooperating components, a connector,
architectural level exception handling scope, etc. We will define for each
approach the architectural elements involved in recovery.
—Multilevel recovery. Fault tolerance needs to be recursive and it needs to rely on
recursive system structuring. This is crucial for localising recovery and reducing
the overall system complexity. Multilevel recovery can be achieved by creating
nested scopes or multiple system layers.
We will discuss where appropriate how the architectural approaches proposed
achieve multilevel recovery.
—Type of redundancy. All fault tolerance mechanisms use redundancy.
In our classification we will state which type of redundancy the architectural
solutions surveyed employ. This will be done in terms of software architecture.
3.3 Other Parameters
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 described the main parameters the classification framework
is based on. This section, instead, will introduce some minor parameters, still of
interest for providing a wide perspective on this topic. The proposed parameters
analyse how proposed FT SA approaches can be categorized:
—By Year: when the selected papers have been published. This view will provide
a panorama on how the effort on the topic has been distributed over the last few
years.
—By Author: who are the main investigators. This view will show which groups are
working on which topic, in order to geographically locate research on architecting
fault tolerant systems.
—By Type of Event: where papers have been published. This parameter will outline
in which type of events (workshops, conferences, journals) such novel approaches
have been published.
4. CLASSIFYING EXISTENT APPROACHES ACCORDING TO THE FRAMEWORK
4.1 Scope of this Survey
Our work on this survey started with defining the criteria for selecting the pa-
pers. This was a crucial part of our work considering considerable amount of work
conducted in the areas of software engineering and dependability, as well as con-
fusing and often contradicting terminology used in these and the related domains
of computer science.
First of all, we selected the papers which present work on fault tolerance as
one of the means for attaining dependability as defined in [Avizienis et al. 2004].
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This set of fundamental concepts was introduced more than 20 years ago and since
than has served as the reference point for the majority of work conducted by the
dependability community in general2. It was not our intention to interpret the terms
used in the papers which do not explicitly mention fault tolerance, in general, or
its parts (such as error detection and system recovery). This, for example, ruled
out some papers on adaptation, self-healing and survivability.
Our second criterion was to select the papers which directly contribute to the
fault tolerance research. This ruled out several papers which focus on other issues
but use fault tolerance examples as a case to demonstrate their approaches, as well
as some papers describing fault tolerant architectures rather than fault tolerance
solutions.
The last criteria was to include the papers explicitly focusing on architecting fault
tolerant systems and which, more specifically, define system structuring during the
early design in terms of some or all of the following concepts: system components,
connectors/channels, configurations and interfaces. This criterion ruled out some
work on fault tolerant middleware and protocol stacks which aim at ensuring cor-
rect, ordered and fault tolerant interactions in distributed systems and offers various
services helping designers of complex applications (e.g., as programming language
APIs). This is again consistent with our overall aim of analysing architectural
approaches aiming at making applications fault tolerant.
Based on the criteria described above, we found out that 39 papers match
the criteria and should be presented according to the classification framework
parameters. The selected papers are illustrated in Figure 3: the first column
provides an acronym for the selected papers according to the following format:
<authors>,<event><year>. The second column shows some graphical symbols:
identical symbols identify papers on the same exact topic; the full set of papers will
be partitioned according to those symbols. The third column provides a numerical
ID for each paper. The fourth column list the paper authors. The fifth column de-
scribes the paper title. The sixth column describes an acronym identifying in which
event the paper has been published. The last column links to the full reference.
Instead of proposing a per paper classification, the surveyed papers which resulted
to be dealing with the same specific research line are grouped together as shown in
Figure 4 in what we refer as an “approach”. Thus, the next sections 4.3 and 4.4
will classify those approaches according to the classification parameters presented
in Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
A brief and structured summary of each single approach, in terms of keywords,
approach goal, and brief summary, is presented in Appendix A.
4.2 How to Read and Use this Survey
If the reader is not coming from the software engineering or dependability com-
munities, sections 2 and 3 will provide him/her with the material sufficient to
understand the main bulk of this paper. If the reader comes from one of the two
communities, he/she may need to look into Section 2 to get the basic concepts
related to the work of the other community, and to Section 3 to understand the
2http://www.dependability.org/wg10.4/
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meaning of each parameter. Sections 4 and 5 contain the main results of this study.
The results of this survey should help practitioners to find suitable solutions to
the concrete problem of architecting fault tolerant systems. Their work should
start with the definition of the fault tolerant requirements. Afterwards, the main
usage scenario we envision will be the one in which the software architects (work-
ing with the specification of a fault tolerant architecture which addresses these
requirements) and for the dependability experts (asked to find an appropriate fault
tolerant solution at the architectural level) read the paper and get a proper shared
understanding of the terminology, problems and solutions. This will create a com-
mon language for their discussions. Based on the results of our study, we expect
that they will be able either to find a proper solution meeting the requirements or
to define a new solution driven by the existing ones.
4.3 Parameters by Parameters view: Software Architecture viewpoint
By starting from the software architecture viewpoint classification framework
proposed in the previous Section 3.1, this section analyses how surveyed approaches
for handling FT SAs can be categorized. Figure 4 provides a graphical view of the
classification results.
4.3.1 SA Concepts. As shown in Figure 5, being components first class entities
in FT SA modeling, any approach provides an explicit specification of them. Most
of the approaches uses connectors or channels, some of them uses interfaces, and
less than half approaches make an explicit use of configuration concepts in a fault
tolerant software architecture specification.
Six are the approaches which explicitly handle the four main SA concepts taken
into consideration: A03, A04, A09, A17, A20, and A21.
In A03 the authors consider exception handling implemented within components
and connectors, and exception handling at the level of the architecture configura-
tion. Components and connectors can raise exceptions. The “configuration excep-
tions” specification describes the conditions that lead to exceptions occurrences.
Interfaces permit the interaction among components and connectors, and allow for
the SA configuration.
A04 incorporates error recovery at the architectural level by combined application
of different architectural styles and design patterns. The selected styles and patterns
make an explicit usage of components, connectors, interfaces, and configuration.
In A09 components can evolve in an evolving architectural configuration. Inter-
faces are the mean for obtaining dependable services while dealing with undepend-
able components.
In A17 the iC2C style and the FaTC2 framework for implementing fault tolerant
architectures (written according to the iC2C style) are introduced. Rules on how
components and connectors can communicate through interfaces are identified.
A20 illustrates how to architect Web Services. A Web Service architecture is
described in terms of its components, connectors, interfaces and configuration.
A21 analyses how the Coordinated Atomic actions can be used for architectural
reconfiguration. Two main interfaces (the Application services and the Configura-
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Fig. 4. Surveyed Approaches
tion services interfaces) are introduced to make a clear distinction between architec-
tural representation and reconfiguration. Connectors play a main role, since they
maintain a clear separation between application and configuration, and embodies
the reconfiguration semantics.
On the opposite, only three are the approaches were only components are treated
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explicitly: A2, A11, and A16.
A2 proposes the Hercules framework, so to keep multiple versions of the same
component running. Interfaces, connectors and configurations are not explicitly
taken into consideration.
A11 proposes some initial results of the CORRECT project, where through a
model driven engineering approach, Coordinated Atomic actions specifications are
utilized so to identify components to be implemented.
A16 describes fault tolerant systems consisting of fault tolerant components.
Errors are detected by components and either dealt with at the component level or
propagated to the components of the higher level.
4.3.2 SA Specification. Only some of the analysed approaches provide some for-
malisms to specify the fault tolerant software architecture.
In particular, seven are the main approaches using formal languages for modeling
the fault tolerant architecture: A01, A14, A15, A16, A17, A22, and A25.
In A013 the authors make use of the WRIGHT architecture description language
to model the SIMPLEX architecture for dependable and evolvable process-control
software-intensive systems.
In A14 the Stochastic Activity Networks, a variant of Stochastic Petri Nets with
a graphical representation, are utilized to model the proposed methodology for
handling multiple classes of faults in COTS- and Legacy-based applications.
A15 makes use of some formal models: the Dependable-LQN model, a perfor-
mance and dependability model for fault tolerant applications, combining two parts:
a Fault-Tolerant Layered Queueing Network (FTLQN) sub-model for describing the
layered software architecture, and a Model for Availability Management Architec-
ture (MAMA) sub-model for describing the fault management architecture.
In A16 the formal B method is used to specify a layered system. Abstract speci-
fications are refined so to smoothly incorporate reasoning about fault tolerance into
the software development process.
In A17 the Idealized C2 Component model is introduced and specified extending
the C2 architectural language.
A22 uses the Modal Action Logic specification language to specify components
in terms of attributes, actions and axioms. The Modal Action Logic specification
is then systematically translated into finite state models, by extending the LTSA
approach and the FSP algebra [Magee and Kramer 2006].
A25 makes use of the ACME architectural language so to specify the architectural
model.
Approaches A03 and A24 also make somehow use of formal specification lan-
guages: A03 extends a generic architectural language with constructs to model
exceptions and their handlers; A24 makes use of UPPAAL for modeling the in-
teraction of components and connectors in the Idealized Fault Tolerance Element
concept introduced in the paper.
3please consider that for A01 we included only two - the most repre-
sentative and complete references. For more information, please refer to
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/simplex/simplex architecture.html
Technical Report
Architecting Fault Tolerant Systems · 17
Model-based specifications are instead utilized mainly in approaches A11, A19,
and A23.
In A11 a model-driven engineering approach for architecting fault tolerance sys-
tems is presented. The approach uses a UML-based notation for modelling Coor-
dinated Atomic actions and an MDA development support tool.
In A19 Use case, Class and Sequence diagrams are used towards the entire life-
cycle to model fault tolerance from requirements to architectural and low-level
design.
In A23 Use Case, Component, and State machine diagrams are used towards
the life-cycle to specify normal and exceptional behaviour from requirements to
architectural description and analysis.
A24 can be also (barely) classified as using a model-based specification, since it
makes use of stereotyped component and sequence diagrams to describe the four
main idealized fault tolerant architectural elements (iFTEs) enforcing the principles
associated with the idealized fault tolerant component model.
Moving to the next sub-parameter, four approaches make use of behavioural mod-
els: A09, A19, A22, and A23.
A09 makes use of extended time automata diagrams in order to specify the be-
haviour of architectural components. In A19 (and specifically in [da S. Brito et al.
2005]) activity diagrams are used in order to specify how components interact. In
A22 Labelled Transition Systems are used to specify components normal and abnor-
mal behaviour. In A23 UML state diagrams are utilized for modeling components
normal and abnormal behaviours.
4.3.3 Analysis. While many approaches focus on how to specify a fault tolerant
software architecture, only few of them concentrate on how to use such specification
for analysis purposes.
Approaches A19, A23, and (somehow) A08 apply testing to fault tolerant archi-
tectures.
A19 proposes the MDCE+ methodology for the definition and testing of the
exceptional activity of component-based software systems. Unit testing is applied
over component-based systems. Testing and development are run in parallel in the
development process.
In A23 a testing approach is utilized to validate the conformance of the system
implementation to fault tolerance requirements, through the fault-tolerant CBSA
specification.
In A08 just-in-time component testing is utilized over the RAIC (redundant ar-
rays of independent components) approach.
Consistency checking of fault tolerant architectures is applied in approaches A01,
A09, A22, and A25 (partially on A02 and A24).
A01 uses CSP and the FDR model checking engine to validate the Simplex ar-
chitecture compliance to selected requirements (such as safety and liveness).
In A09 safety analysis of the normal and abnormal system behaviour is conducted
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over the co-operative architecture by using timed automata and the UPPAALmodel
checker.
In A22 the authors make use of the Labelled Transition System Analyzer (LTSA)
tool for formal SA specification and model checking.
In A25 Alloy is used for validating the Software Architecture and exception model
specified in ACME. The normal architectural specification is enriched with an ex-
ception flow view; the obtained model is then converted to Alloy and submitted to
Alloy analysis.
In A02 a Constraint Evaluator component is used to analyse the component
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version output with respect to domain constraints. In A24 idealized fault tolerant
elements (components, connectors and their interactions) are modelled in UPPAAL
and their correctness is verified using model checking.
Performance analysis is applied in A15 (and partially in A01).
A15 integrates fault tolerance and performance models in a Dependable-LQN
model. Towards a six phases approach, the Dependable-LQN model can be elabo-
rated and solved in order to obtain performance measures.
In the Simplex architecture proposed in approach A01, hardware and software
fault tolerance is guaranteed through analytic redundancy in which two versions, a
high-assurance and a high-performance ones, are used in combination. The archi-
tecture provides a guarantee of the existing level of performance when software fails.
Monitoring of fault tolerant architectures is described in A13 and partially on
A01 and A07.
A13 describes how the Lira framework monitoring and reconfiguration capabili-
ties can be used for monitoring critical events (including system errors and compo-
nent failures) and reconfiguring the component-based system accordingly.
In A01 monitoring techniques are utilized to analyse wether a run-time change
in the Simplex architecture is safe or not. In A07 a specialised Multi-Version Con-
nector is used to monitor the execution of several components versions, to collect
the history of version execution and to dynamically remove less reliable versions or
replace the old version with the new one.
Mismatch, compositional, and simulation analysis are performed in A10, A12,
and A14, respectively.
A10 proposes an approach for tolerating mismatches by using error detection and
system recovery.
In A12 the authors focus on components integration and misbehaviours due to
dependencies violation. They use self-adaptation so to recover from misbehaviours.
In A14 fault tolerance modelling is conducted using Stochastic Activity Networks
which are simulated by using the MOBIUS tool.
4.3.4 Specification and Analysis. Eight are the approaches providing both mod-
eling and analysis of fault tolerant architectures: A01, A09, A14, A15, A19, A22,
A23, and A25 (A24 partially).
A01 presents the Simplex architecture. Consistency checking, performance anal-
ysis and monitoring are utilized together for ensuring system fault tolerance and
offering a reliable, safe and easy way of upgrading a system while it is in operation.
A09 introduces a co-operative architectural style where, a specialised connector
is defined to capture the collaborative behaviour of components. Safety analysis
of the normal and abnormal system behaviour is conducted over the co-operative
architecture by using timed automata and the UPPAAL model checker. The ap-
proach is demonstrated by modelling a destruction system of the VS-40X sounding
rocket.
In A14 fault tolerance modelling is conducted using Stochastic Activity Networks
that can be successively simulated.
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In A15 the Dependable-LQN performance and dependability formal model is
introduced and, towards a six phases approach, the model can be elaborated and
solved in order to obtain performance measures.
In A19 UML-based notations are utilized to specify the architecture according
to the MDCE+ approach and unit testing is applied over single components.
In the Magee Maibaum approach presented in A22 the architecture is specified
through a formal language and submitted to model checking analysis.
In A23 the normal and exceptional architecture-level behaviours are modeled
using the UML and submitted to conformance testing.
In A24 the correctness of the proposed idealized fault tolerant component model
is checked using UPPAAL.
In A25 the architecture and exceptional model are expressed using ACME and
the merged model is validated with Alloy.
4.3.5 Coding. Some of the surveyed approaches provide support for code gen-
eration starting from an architectural model.
A03 introduces initial study of the Aster prototype. It supports the system-
atic mapping of architectures to their implementation using a middleware-based
solution. The run-time support for exception handling is composed by three main
components running over a CORBA-compliant middleware.
A11 introduces initial study on the CORRECT MDA approach: given a Coordi-
nated Atomic action specification, the approach enables the automatic production
of Java code implementing the fault tolerance properties described in the coordinate
atomic action specification. Reference [Capozucca et al. 2006] provides an up-to-
date framework, called CAA-DRIP, for automatically generating Java skeletal code
from Coordinated Atomic actions.
In A17 the FaTC2 object oriented framework for implementing the iC2C architecture-
level exception handling approach is proposed. FaTC2 extends the Java version of
the C2.Fw framework.
In A19 the authors propose an exception handling mechanism (at the imple-
mentation level) to support an explicit separation among normal and exceptional
activities; the Java programming language is used to implement components, while
the meta-object protocol (MOP) is advised to implement the responsibilities of the
exception mechanisms.
4.3.6 Specification and Coding. The intersection among specification and coding
approaches is composed by the four approaches discussed in the coding section.
In A03 the Aster architecture description language (ADL) is introduced (by ex-
tending a generic ADL through exception handling-related information). Architec-
tures specified in the Aster ADL can be implemented through the Aster middleware-
based framework.
A11 makes use of model-based specification of Coordinated Atomic actions in
terms of activity diagrams and translates such diagrams into Java code, according
to the CORRECT MDA approach.
A17 extends the C2 architecture description language graphical notation in order
to add exception handling features according to the C2 implementation of the ide-
alized fault tolerant component model (iC2C model). The FaTC2 Java framework
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allows the implementation of iC2C architectures.
In A19 a UML-based specification (mainly component diagrams) for fault tolerant
architectures is provided and a Java implementation of components is generated.
4.3.7 Run-Time & Dynamic Reconfiguration. Many are the approaches dealing
with run-time architectures and dynamic reconfigurations.
A01 introduces the Simplex architecture ensuring system fault tolerance and
offering a reliable, safe and easy way of upgrading a system while it is in opera-
tion. Software evolution and change management are the main keywords of such
approach.
In A02 Cook and Dage propose the Hercules framework that, when upgrading
the system, maintains the previous components versions running, so to avoid newly
introduced errors. The main principle is that dynamicity shall improve the overall
dependability, not diminishing it.
A03 describes how to extend an architecture specification by introducing a con-
figuration exception specification and handlers. When an exception is caught, the
architecture is dynamically reconfigured. The Aster environment is presented, aim-
ing at providing an implementation-level support for architecture reconfiguration
via a middleware architecture. The interceptor facility of CORBA is used for en-
abling component instances reconfiguration.
A07 extends the work initially proposed by Rivera et al. in A01 so to ensure fault
tolerance of system under upgrade by dynamically connecting old and new releases
of off-the-shelves components.
A08 presents RAIC (redundant arrays of independent components) to allow var-
ious levels of component redundancy.
A12 proposes strategies for component-based self-adaptability in peer-to-peer
(P2P) architectures. The main principle is that being P2P highly dynamic, it is
important to guarantee their dependability during dynamic changes. The authors
propose DeEvolve, a component-based self-adaptable P2P architecture which ex-
tends the traditional concept of adaptation by accomplishing explicit error detection
and exception handling at the architectural level.
A13 presents a framework, which extending the Lira framework, permits to mon-
itor critical events, make decisions based on the monitored data, and reconfigure
the system accordingly.
In A18 the authors propose an approach for exception handling in component
composition at the architectural level with the support of middleware: an excep-
tion handling model (representing the main contribution of the paper) describes
when to handle exceptions and what strategies shall be taken to handle them. The
middleware monitors the system execution at run-time and enforces the handling
of exceptions (according to the exception model). The approach is based on the
PKUAS J2EE-compliant middleware and considers the component array, replace-
ment, replica, and reboot mechanisms provided by it.
In A20 a pattern for improving web services availability and dynamic reconfigu-
ration is proposed. The pattern, by dealing with the architectural elements of four
types captures the main functionalities specific for dynamic composition of Web
services.
In A21 reconfiguration is specified using Coordinated Atomic actions so to achieve
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a clear separation of the application and reconfiguration activities. Coordinated
Atomic actions are proved to be a suitable mechanism for architectural reconfigu-
ration as this activity typically involves several cooperating components and needs
to be fault tolerant.
Approach A22 focusses on modelling and analysing fault handling conducted by
dynamic system reconfiguration. The Modal Action Logic specification language is
introduced for specifying and reasoning about dynamically-reconfigurable systems.
4.3.8 FT Software Process. How to integrate an architecture-level fault toler-
ance with the other phases in the software life-cycle has been analysed in nine
approaches.
A04 focusses on two main software development phases: architectural design
and low-level design. A software architecture for developing dependable systems
is initially presented (based on two architectural styles and introducing atomicity,
exception handling, and coordinated error recovery at the architectural level) and
successively refined through a set of design patterns, to provide a clear separation
between application functionality and those needed for dependability.
Approach A05 focusses on architectural and detailed design, and provides the
transition from the two phases through architectural refinement, architectural styles
and design patterns.
A11 proposes a Model Driven Architecture-based approach while introducing the
DRIP Catalyst process: Coordinated Atomic actions are specified using a UML-
Profile, and Java code is generated automatically from such specification.
A16 proposes a specification pattern that can be recursively applied to formally
specify exception raising and handling at each architectural layer. The goal is to
start from an abstract specification in the B formal language, and gradually add
lower layers by refinement.
A17 discusses an exception handling system which adds fault tolerance to component-
based systems at the architectural level. By combining two architectural styles, the
iC2C and iCOTS styles are created. An architecture, modeled according to such
styles, can be implemented through the ALEX framework.
A19 focusses on the entire software process, from requirements to coding. Their
approach considers how to specify normal and exceptional requirements, how to
use this information for driving the component specification and design phase, and
how to implement all such information using a framework Java-based. The proposes
software process is based on the Catalysis process. In [da S. Brito et al. 2005] a
similar strategy is adopted based on the UML Components Process.
A23 starts from Use Case diagrams, detects exceptions from use cases, and use
this information for guiding the architectural design stage.
4.3.9 FT Style. An interesting amount of work has been done on introducing
architectural fault tolerance styles and design patterns for dependable system.
In A04 the Idealised Fault-Tolerant Component and Role-based Collaboration
styles are combined in order to produce a dependable software architecture. This
style is successively refined into design patterns in order to bridge the transition
from software architecture design and coding. The Exception, Handler, Exception
Handling Strategy, Reflective Role and Competitive Collaboration patterns are
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utilized to implement the dependable software architecture.
A05 presents an exception handling architectural model (composed by four main
components) and provide a systematic approach to incorporate exception handling
during the detailed design stage by refining through design patterns the general
components of the proposed architecture. The Exception, Handler, Exception Han-
dling Strategy and Concurrent Exception Handling Action patterns are presented
in order to map architectural decisions and exception handling guidelines at the
low-level design.
A08 introduces the RAIC (redundant arrays of independent components) as an
approach to achieve higher dependability and to improving desirable properties of
the component-based systems. The RAIC architectural style linking redundant
components and the controller is presented.
A09 introduces a co-operative architectural style while enhancing the client-server
style in order to capture the collaborative behaviour between architectural compo-
nents. The proposed style enables components adaptation in evolving dependable
systems.
A16 introduces a formal specification pattern that can be recursively applied to
formally specify exception raising and handling at each architectural layer.
In A17 the integration among the C2 and the Idealised Fault-Tolerant Component
(IFTC) style is provided. The Idealised C2 Component style is the output of this
integration process. This new style treats the normal activities as in the C2 style
and the abnormal activity according to the IFTC style.
A19 proposes a systematic approach to incorporating exception handling in all
phases of software development, from requirement to implementation. At the ar-
chitecture level, the idealized fault tolerant component model style is utilised to
produce a fault tolerant SA.
In A20 an architectural pattern based on two main principles is proposed: com-
ponents implement a crash-failure semantics and the system supports dynamic re-
configuration. The pattern is presented in terms of components, interfaces and
connections between interfaces and applied to a case study.
A24 introduces the Idealised FT architectural component (iFTComponent), the
Idealised FT architectural connector (iFTConnector), and in general, the Idealized
FT architectural element (iFTE). iFTE has its own style which prescribes the way
components and connectors inside this iFTE are integrated.
A25 introduces the concept of exceptional styles. The Aeral framework provides
a basic architectural style (expressed in ACME) which can be extended in order to
create new exceptional styles.
4.3.10 Tool Support. Only few of the analysed papers are tool supported.
In A03 the Aster prototypal middleware support for the Aster ADL is introduced.
The tool consists in an extension to the CORBA middleware in order to deal with
exceptional behaviours.
In A05 a Java-based prototype of the proposed exception handling approach is
presented, based on previous work on the Guaran meta-object protocol.
In A11 the CORRECT tool is introduced: based on MDA technologies, it allows
to specify Coordinated Atomic actions through a UML-based profile and to auto-
matically generate Java code for the normal and exceptional behaviour. The code
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generation process has been recently discussed in details in [Capozucca et al. 2006].
A13 builds on top of the Lira framework for reconfiguration-based fault tolerance
in distributed systems.
In A17 the FaTC2 Java framework for implementing the Idealised C2 Component
model and style is presented. The FaTC2 framework is a conservative extension to
the C2.fw [C2 Style ] Java framework, with extensions for dealing with exceptional
behaviours.
A22 makes use of the LTSA tool for specifying and reasoning about dynamically-
reconfigurable, multi component systems with mechanisms for specifying normal
and abnormal behaviour, and recovery actions (fault handling) by reconfiguration.
In A25 two different tools are proposed: the Composer tool which takes an ar-
chitectural description and the exception flow view as inputs and produces a fault
tolerant architectural specification in an extended ACME specification. The Con-
verter tool which translates the ACME model into an Alloy specification, to be
used for analysis purposes.
4.4 Parameters by Parameters view: Fault Tolerance viewpoint
This section summarises the selected approaches following the fault tolerance
classification parameters defined in section 3.2.
4.4.1 Fault Assumptions. Fault assumptions define the types of faults the ar-
chitectural solution proposed intends to tolerate. Our main focus here is on defined
the assumptions in terms of software architectures. The approaches offer a good
coverage of the types of faults they can tolerate: some of them deal specifically
with the failures of architectural elements (components or connectors), some of
them are intended for system (configuration or architectural) level exceptions and
inconsistencies, the remaining few deal with hardware faults, human errors and
errors detected during architectural reconfiguration.
The majority of the approaches focus on dealing with component failures rep-
resenting errors at the architectural level. These can be categorised into 4 major
categories. Approaches A03-A06, A14, A17-A19 and A22-A25 deal with the ex-
ceptions explicitly reported by individual components when they are not able to
deliver the expected results - it is very often the case that the component inter-
faces are extended with the descriptions of the exceptions they can signal (e.g. A06
and A25). Approaches A13, A15, A20 and A22 deal with failures of the individual
components with the well-defined semantics of this failure behaviour, such as crash,
value or Byzantine failures. Only two approaches (A01 and A08) deal with general
types of the design faults in the component software (bugs). Two approaches (A02
and A07) explicitly focus on software faults in the new releases of the components.
Failures of the architectural connectors are addressed by approaches A03 and
A24. These failures are propagated by the connectors to the higher-level architec-
tural context in which they are dealt with. For example, approach A03 introduces
the concept of configuration exception handling to support system reconfiguration
when exceptions are explicitly propagated by individual components or connectors:
components and connectors interfaces specify the exceptions these elements can
propagate when they cannot deliver the service expected form them.
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Approaches dealing with system level inconsistencies and errors deal with the
abnormal situations affecting the architectural level involving several interlinked
components. A04, A06, A09, A11 and A24 assume that such errors emerge during
cooperation of a defined set of components explicitly taking part in this joint work.
Approach A10 specifically focuses on general solutions for dealing with architectural
level mismatches. Approaches A12, A14 and A22 deal with the general types of
the abnormal behaviour exhibited at the system level.
Very often the approaches deal with several types of faults, for example, approach
A22 covers failures of the individual components and system level errors.
Only few approaches focus specifically on the hardware faults (A14 and A16)
but even in this they always consider the implications at the level of software
architecture and the solutions in the software architecture context. A14 deals with
the hardware-induced software faults and host crashes, whereas A16 deals with
service failures where services are viewed as a combination of software and hardware
on which this software located. We have found that the approaches discussed do not
explicitly deal with the environmental faults. This is because they usually assume
that components represent the environment (e.g. sensors), so the component faults
are used to represent the faults in the environment.
The results of our analysis are summarised in Figure 6.
4.4.2 The origins of the software architecture solution. It is only natural that
the majority of the architectural solutions discussed here rely on the known fault
tolerance mechanisms which were initially developed for the design or implementa-
tion phases. It is clear, on the other hand, that some of the known fault tolerance
mechanisms aiming at design and implementation (e.g. found in the middleware)
do not find their way to the architectural level reasoning about the system as they
deal with the implementation level problems by using implementation level means.
By now a number of the major fault tolerance mechanisms have been moved
to the architectural level and presented in terms of components, connectors and
system configurations. A01 uses the ideas of recovery blocks with the special de-
cision logic implementing the acceptance test and with the two alternates (the
high-performance and the high assurance ones), A02 and A07 relies on the ideas
of N-version programming, A08 uses a combination of recovery blocks, N-version
programming and triple module redundancy. A20 resembles the N Self-Checking
Programming technique for software fault tolerance [Laprie et al. 1990], however
it does not employs two levels of comparison since this scheme does not deal with
the design bugs. A14 uses replication of the COTS components and the majority
voting on the component results. A15 employs several known replication strategies
at the architectural component level: primary-standby, active and load-balancing
redundancy.
The majority of the approaches use architectural level exception handling as it
provides structuring support for the application-specific recovery. The idealized
fault tolerance blueprint initially proposed for designing fault tolerant systems (in
the first revision of [Lee and Anderson 1990] published in 1981) have been exten-
sively used for developing a number of architectural solutions (A04, A05, A16, A17,
A19, A23 and A24). The ideas of atomic actions and Coordinated Atomic actions
have been applied at the architectural level in approaches A04, A05, A06, A09 and
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A11 to support cooperative recovery involving several cooperating components and
to structure systems using nested units of component cooperation. Note here that
A04 and A05 support two orthogonal architectural views. A21 uses Coordinated
Atomic actions for structuring system reconfiguration during fault handling.
4.4.3 Steps of the fault tolerance. The three general steps of fault tolerance
which each approach can provide are error detection, error handling and fault han-
dling. The summary of our analysis can be found in Figure 6.
Several approaches cover all three steps (A08, A10, A14, A20 and A24). Ap-
proach A08 is based on the RAIC (redundant array of independent components)
architecture which uses several diverse components to detect errors, recover after
them and, if necessary, decommission failing components. Approach A24 discusses
an idealized fault tolerant architectural element style which incorporates features
for error detection, error recovery by exception handling and localised reconfigura-
tion at the level of individual connectors and components.
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Five approaches (A05, A11, A19, A23 and A25) only deal with error recovery
(all of them propose solutions for handling exceptions at the architectural level
without discussing how to detect errors or how to handle faults causing these errors)
while two approaches (A21 and A22) focus exclusively on fault handling and, more
specifically, on system reconfiguration ridding systems from faults.
4.4.4 Error detection. Error detection means are part of the majority of the
architectural solutions discussed here - see Figure 6. These solutions offer a wide
variety of the ways in which errors can be detected at the architectural level.
Approaches A01, A08 and A24 use specially-designed acceptance test to check
the results of diversely-designed component execution. The compensation schemes
using comparison of the multiple execution results for detecting the errors are em-
ployed in approaches A02, A07, A08, A14 and A20. For example, approach A07
uses a dedicated multi-version connector monitoring the execution of several re-
leases and collecting the history of their execution.
Some approaches explicitly assume that component errors are detected by some
extra architectural elements (connectors or/and components) as part of the archi-
tectural style for developing idealized components capable of detecting errors - in
this case these components detect errors themselves and the corresponding excep-
tions are defined in the component interfaces as part of the software architecture
description (A04, A16, A17 and A24).
Approach A06 explicitly introduces a protective wrapper, a redundant architec-
tural element intended for detecting errors coming from the component or sent to
the component. System level error detection is used in approaches A06, A09, A12
and A13. For example, A13 uses a dedicated monitoring infrastructure called Lira
collecting information about critical events at the architectural level. In additional
to acceptance tests and result comparison approach A08 uses just in time com-
ponent testing to ensure better coverage of error detection. Approach A10 offers
general solutions for detecting errors caused by architectural mismatches using an
additional information associated with components.
4.4.5 Error handling type. The application-specific error handling supporting
forward error recovery using exception handing techniques is clearly the dominant
approach - see Figure 6. This is understandable considering the fact that this
type of recovery is the most general and effective one. Moreover, the assumption
that architectural elements can be rolled back for recovery does not seem to be
practical from the architects’ point of view - the main reason for this can be either
that often they deal with the COTS components or that this assumption is too
strong/restricting to be accepted at the earlier steps of system development.
Several approaches use various forms of compensations (A01, A02, A07, A08,
A14, A15, A18 and A20 - they employ redundant (diverse or replicated) versions
of software components to mask errors. In particular, all of them except for A01
run several versions in parallel and adjudicate their results to define the correct
ones. Approach A20 employs redundant sources of information of the Internet
(Web Services) and four dedicated architectural elements (called Bridge, Compara-
tor, ServiceBroker and FT Registry) which ensure the result comparison and, if
necessary, dynamic reconfiguration (i.e. fault handing) when some of the elements
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fail. Approaches A01, A08, A15 and A18 execute redundant versions sequentially
and use some sort of acceptant test to check their results. Some of them support var-
ious forms of compensations, for example, A08 allows a combination of N-version
programming, recovery blocks and triple-modular redundancy depending on the
configuration chosen.
Approaches A02 and A07 employs previous releases of the components as a means
for tolerating faults in the new release using diversity but in addition to this A07
supports architectural undo when the states of all releases are moved back (A07
being the only approach explicitly supporting backward error recovery).
It is interesting to note that approach A18 supports general system level exception
handling, giving as the specific examples the compensation-based approaches: the
RAIC defined in A08 and component replication.
Approach A10 introduces a general framework for dealing with errors cased by
architectural mismatches and as such it supports all types of error handling.
4.4.6 Fault handling type. It should not be coming as a surprise that a consid-
erable number of approaches offer support for fault handling by reconfiguration as
system (re)configuration is in the core of software architecture - see Figure 6. Some
of these approaches define interesting and unusual combinations of error recovery
and fault handling mechanisms.
Approach A08 uses the RAIC architecture that, in addition to error recovery by
compensation, supports decommissioning of the underperforming components and
including new components into the array (with their state modified to be identical
with the rest) - all these activity is conducted by a specialised RAIC controller.
Approach A12 supports various exception handling strategies which can provide
both error recovery and system reconfiguration for fault handling. The latter is
done by using the set of available components (by adjusting their parameters or
by building new configurations out of them). Approach A03 explicitly introduces
reconfigurations as the configuration level exception handlers.
Approach A13 introduces multi-level reconfiguration of assemblies of the COTS
components. System-level error detection is conducted by monitoring curtail system-
level events, which is followed by run-time fault diagnosis and fault handling by
reconfiguration. Three reconfiguration levels are defined: the component, compo-
sition and global levels, so that if it is not possible to handle a fault at the lower
level an attempt is made to handle it at the higher one.
Approach A14 employs reconfiguration based on accurate fault diagnosis: to
support this the information about the COTS components is collected over some
time and assessed to identify the damage. Possible reconfiguration actions include
application restart, reboot, and restoring the DB using multiple copies.
Approach A15 introduces a managing layered architecture in which components
can fail and be repaired and different reconfiguration policies defined. It supports
replica reconfiguration by adding, repairing or removing individual replicas. The
focus of this work in on defining modelling techniques for analysing systems sup-
porting fault handling.
The exception handling approach A18 allows some forms of fault handling by
supporting description of so-called ”induced failures” defining components which
should be treated as failed after an exception is raised and handled. This approach
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combines system level exception handling and fault handling strategies. It considers
as a special cases the RAIC, component reboot and component replacement.
Apart from error recovery by compensation approach A20 supports dynamic re-
configuration using a registry which allows the system broker to dynamically find
redundant and available web services which can be deployed to replace the failed
ones. Approach A21 use Coordinated Atomic actions for architectural reconfigura-
tion as part of fault handling - this allows us to tolerate system level faults during
reconfiguration by employing cooperative exception handling. Approach A22 de-
fines a theory for modelling and verification of various dynamic reconfiguration
strategies. Approach A24 introduces localised reconfiguration as a possible way of
conducting error recovery - this is executed at the level of individual connectors
and components.
4.4.7 Exception handling. To summarise better the exception handling archi-
tectural approaches we first need to look into how the exceptions are propagated -
see Figure 6. This is typically done either by architectural elements (components,
connectors) or by the system/architecture itself. Approaches A03, A04, A05, A06,
A16, A17, A19, A23, A24 and A24 assume that the individual components signal
exceptions to the level of architecture. Approaches A03, A24 and A25 extend this
idea to the individual connectors. Approaches A09 and A18 allow exceptions to
be signalled at the architectural level in general, without assuming that they are
coming from either individual components or connectors - they are applicable when
the system architecture includes a glue code responsible for composing components
into a system. Approach A06 assumes that components are wrapped by a dedicated
wrapper component which represents component behaviour in the context of the
system architecture - in which case it is clear that this component should be able
to signal architectural-level exceptions.
Our second classification criterion defines where the exceptions are handled in
the architecture. Approaches A04, A05, A16, A17, A19, A23, A24 and A25 sup-
port exception handling by individual components, whereas A24 and A25 allow not
only component-level but also connector-level exception handling. A considerable
number of approaches support cooperative exception handling involving sets of co-
operating components: A04, A05, A06, A09, A11, A19 and A24. Let us consider
A04 as an example - this approach defines two orthogonal dimensions in which
exception handling is conducted: (i) exceptions can be defined in the component
interface in which case they are handled by the caller component and (ii) exceptions
can be raised by cooperating components playing roles in the same collaboration -
in which case cooperative recovery involving all the roles is conducted. Some ap-
proaches support system level exception handling without associating it specifically
to any architectural elements: A06, A12 and A18. For example, in approach A12
exception handling strategies are defined during component (peer services in this
case) composition and they can include various architectural level activities includ-
ing changing the attributes of individual components, changing connections between
components and system reconfiguration. These specific cases of error recovery bring
this approach very close to approach A03 which explicitly defines configuration-level
exception handling, so that reactions to architectural level exceptions are defined
in terms of system reconfiguration activities.
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Some approaches use stylised architectures or a set of guidelines for represent-
ing exception handling at the architectural level. Two major general stylesed ap-
proaches are idealised fault tolerant component (A04, A05, A16, A17, A19, A23
and A24) and Coordinated Atomic actions (A04, A05, A06, A09 and A11). An
example of the former is approach A17 in which each component is architectured
as a style with two components and three connectors, so that a specialised compo-
nent called AbnormalActivity is designed to conduct exception handling. All of the
approaches relying on the Coordinated Atomic actions use some form of concurrent
exception resolution at the architectural level to deal with exceptions concurrently
raised at the system level by the action participants). For example, approach A09
supports cooperative recovery of several COTS components involved in cooperation
at the architectural level by introducing a cooperating connector that contains all
cooperative recovery and deals with concurrent exceptions by resolving them when
necessary.
It is interesting to note here that all exception handling approaches without
exceptions use the termination model [Goodenough 1975], which is clearly much
more suitable than the resumption model for the architectural level reasoning about
the systems.
4.4.8 Error confinement and recovery domain. The majority of the architectural
error recovery approaches assume that individual components confine errors - see
Figure 6. For example, in approaches A02 and A07 errors are confined to the
component (i.e. the new release of it). Approach A24 extends this to the connectors
and to the sets of cooperating components. Connectors are considered as the units
of confinement and recovery in approaches A09, A19 and A24. In A09 an action
of cooperating components is architectured as a specialised cooperating connector
which has several roles, one for each component, so that recovery always involves
groups of components.
There are several approaches (A04, A05, A06, A09, A11, A19 and A24) which use
cooperative recovery involving several cooperating components at the architectural
level. The architecture of the systems is built in this case using structuring units of
component cooperation as the first class entities. These approaches deal with both
error confinement and consistency of the recovery involving several components
which work together not only during normal system execution, but during recov-
ery as well. Approach A04 relies on the two architectural views for confinement
and recovery: (i) individual component view in which components confine errors so
that recovery is conducted at the higher level by the caller and (ii) collaboration
view in which cooperative recovery can be conducted by involving several compo-
nents playing roles in the same collaboration. Approach A05 supports two types of
recovery: local recovery at the level of the component and cooperative recovery in-
volving several cooperating components inside an action, allowing as such two types
of recovery domains: individual components and actions (groups) of cooperating
components.
Approaches A10, A12, A18 and A25 do not assume any general ways of system
structuring for confinement and recovery and as such rely on the application-specific
decisions architectured for each specific exception. For example, in approach A18
the error confinement and recovery areas are defined by the exception strategy
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description, individually for each system level exception. In a similar way approach
A25 allows any element of the architecture to be involved in recovery if there is an
explicit exception flow linking it with the source of exceptions (another component).
4.4.9 Multilevel recovery. The idea of defining recursive structuring units of
system architecture is crucial for dealing with system complexity and for fault
tolerance. Introducing these units allows architects to define error confinement
and recovery domains and to ensure that when a recovery in such a unit is not
possible the responsibility for recovery is passed in a systematic and well-defined
way to the containing unit. We refer to this structuring as multilevel recovery at
the architectural level.
Unfortunately the vast majority of the approaches do not introduce multilevel
recovery. But there are still several of them which support it in various ways. Ap-
proach A05 supports two level error recovery: the component level and the level
of a group of cooperating components. Approach A06 takes this idea further by
supporting nested system structuring using the concept of Coordinated Atomic ac-
tions involving nested sets of cooperating components. Approach A11 only focuses
on architecturing systems using nested Coordinated Atomic actions with an under-
standing a simplest action is an action with only one participant executing a set of
operations bracketed at an ACID transaction.
The architectural approaches following the IFTC blueprint (A04, A16 A17, A19,
A23 and A24) support layered system structuring for recovery treating each com-
ponent as a recovery domain; when this recovery is not possible the responsibility
for recovery is passed to the caller component using exception propagation.
Approach A03 introduces an interesting way of nested architecture structuring
by incorporating into the configuration level exception handling a mechanism for
defining subconfigurations and nested reconfigurations. Subconfigurations describe
a subset of components and connectors which interaction may lead to an exception.
Reconfigurations define handlers, so that each of them can define a new configura-
tion which in its turn may include nested specifications of reconfigurations.
4.4.10 Type of redundancy. All architectural level fault tolerance approaches
use redundancy. Each specific case defines a specially-tailored combination of the
redundant resources. A clear understanding of the redundancy which each scheme
uses often gives considerable insights about scheme functioning and about its ben-
efits or weaknesses. Below we discuss only several typical examples.
Many approaches assume that component and connector specifications are ex-
tended with definitions of the exceptions which they can propagate (for example,
A03, A04, A12, A24, etc.).
Approach A03 uses redundant configurations for exception handling at the ar-
chitectural level.
In approach A06 an additional component, i.e. the component wrappers, is
introduced as a glue code responsible for local error detection and recovery and
cooperative recovery.
Approaches A01, A02, A07, A08, A14, A15 and A20 use diverse/replicated com-
ponents together with some adjudicating and controlling mechanisms (often con-
nectors) to manage them. For example, approach A1 uses co-called analytical
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redundancy with two versions a high-assurance and a high-performance ones. A02
and A07 use several releases of a component.
Approaches A16, A17, A19, A23 and A24 follow the IFTC blueprint by defining
a style consisting of a set of specialised connectors and components that together
ensure the idealised behaviour of the application component. For example, in ap-
proach A17 each component is implemented as a style consisting of two components
and three connectors.
To support architectural level exception handling approach A12 uses redundant
links between components, redundancy at the system level to allow adjustment of
the underperforming components and redundant exception handling code at the
system level. Approach A13 uses the following redundancy: the Lira infrastruc-
ture for monitoring (error detection) and reconfiguring, and a decision maker for
fault diagnosis. Approach A25 employs a number of redundant features, additional
information related to exceptions associated with the components, exception flow
views that link components during handing using a special type of connectors called
duck (this effectively offers a redundant view) and an additional code for exception
handling attached to each component.
4.5 Other Parameters
The surveyed approaches are here classified according to the three different pa-
rameters previously introduced in Section 4.5.
—By Year: As shown in Figure 7.a initial effort on investigating how to specify
and analyse fault tolerant architectures has been started in year 1996 with the
CMU/SEI SIMPLEX architecture for ensuring fault tolerance in evolving hard-
ware and software systems. Since year 2001 there has been steady stream of
research papers which clearly shows interest to this area and its maturity. In
years 2001-2003 the main focus has been on architectural styles and patterns for
fault tolerant architectures. Since 2004 we can notice a wider community working
on this topic (as documented by the new contributors to this research area) and
also a rejuvenated interest on the topic, as demonstrated by the somehow high
number of papers published since there.
—By Author: As shown in Figure 7.b Cecilia Mary F. Rubira and Rogerio de Lemos
can be considered the most active researchers on the topic4. By a cross-cut anal-
ysis of the By Year and By Authors views, we can also notice that both have been
investigating this topic since 2001 and almost continuously till nowadays. An-
other interesting data is that more than fifty researchers have been contributing
to this area5.
—By Type of Event: As shown in Figure 7.c most of the research results surveyed in
this paper have been published in workshops, being WADS6 the one publishing
most of them. Many of such papers have been published in conferences, both on
4The numbers in parenthesis refer to the number of papers the researcher was contributing to in
the selected approach.
5this information can be collected by analyzing the contributing authors in Figure 3
6the Architecting Dependable Systems workshop - http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/people/staff/rdl/ADSFuture/resources.htm
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Romanovsky:
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Brito:
a19, A25 (x4)
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A07 (RakicMedvidovic, SSR01),
A09 (deLemos, ICSM01),
A12 (Alda and Cremers, CBSE04),
A16 (Laibinis and Troubitsyna, SEFM04),
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astor Filho et al., LADC03),
A17 (Guerra et al., ESEC/FSE03),
A19 (Ferreira et. al., HASE01),
A19 (Brito et. al., LADC05),
A25 (CastorFilho et al., REFT05)
Journal:
A01 (Sha,  IEEESoftw01),
A09 (deLemos, JSS02),
A14 (Bondavalli et al., IEEE TDSC04),
A19 (Rubira et. al., SP&E05),
A24 (deLemos et al., IEEESoftw06),
A25 (CastorFilho et al., JSS06)
Book Chapters:
A05 (Garcia and Rubira, BC_AEHT01),
A10 (deLemos et al., BC_ADS(I)03),
A13 (Porcarelli et al.,  BC_ADS(II)04),
A15 (DasWoodside, BC_ADS(II)04),
A17 (Guerra et al., BC_ADS(II)04),
A20 (deLemos, BC_ADS(III)05),
A25 (CastorFilho et al., BC_REFT06)
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Technical Report
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Fig. 7. Classification a) by year, b) by author, c) by type of Event
the Software Engineering and Dependable Systems area. By a cross-cut analysis
of the By Type of Event view with respect to the previous ones, we can discover
that most of the journal and book publications is ongoing since 2004.
The tables in Figure 8 and Figure 9 provide a summary of both viewpoints. For
each approach surveyed in this work, the main parameters analysed in Section 4.3
and 4.4 are reported.
5. CONSIDERATIONS AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Unified Summary
This subsection briefly summarises the results of the detailed analysis in Sec-
tion 4 and provides a unified combined description linking software architecture
and fault tolerance parameters. For each of these parameters we discuss the major
achievements and give some detail of the most important links with the parameters
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Fig. 8. The SA viewpoint
of the opposite view.
Figure 8 summarizes our analysis from the software architecture viewpoint.
—SA concepts: While all the approaches provide an explicit description of com-
ponents, the notion of connectors, configuration, and interfaces are explicitly
considered only by a subset of the approaches. The two most popular kinds of
fault assumptions are component failures and system level inconsistencies. Er-
ror detection is typically done at two levels: at the component level (by the
component wrapper, the metadata associated with the component, or by the
component itself) and at the architectural configuration level. The most popular
way of conducting fault handling is by reconfiguring the architecture.
—SA Specification: Only some approaches provide formal or model-based notations
for specifying fault tolerant architectures. This is partially due to the fact that
most of the papers while providing interesting conceptual ideas on how to com-
plement normal architectures with fault tolerant mechanisms, lack real applica-
tion. The majority of the proposed specification languages are based on existing
languages or notations (CSP, Stochastic Petri Nets, Queueing Network, the B
method, the C2 architectural language, the Finite State Process algebra, Acme).
Few approaches report initial work on exception handling specific languages (such
as Aster and Aereal). It is interesting to note that while the model-based specifi-
Technical Report
Architecting Fault Tolerant Systems · 35
cations are becoming widely used for software architecture specifications, most of
the existing notations for dealing with fault tolerant architectures are still based
on formal languages. Only one approach attempts to use both model-based and
formal specification languages together. The SA specification is mainly used for
reasoning about error and fault handling. In this modelling the system architects
describe the expected normal behaviour of the system, the abnormal conditions
that require some recovery, the recovery strategy, and the expected result of
the recovery. Exception handling, idealised fault tolerance component model,
and Coordinated Atomic actions are the most popular fault tolerance concepts
captured by the existing solutions.
—Analysis: Only some approaches support some form of analysis over the fault
tolerant architecture specification. Consistency checking is the most practiced
analysis approach. Testing, performance analysis, simulation, and monitoring are
only applied in a few approaches. As expected, most of the analysis techniques are
supported by an explicit formal or model-based specification of the fault tolerant
architecture. Most of the analysis techniques make also use of or adapt existing
analysis engines: the FDR model checker, the UPPAAL model checker, the LTSA
labelled transition system analyser, the Charmy model checking features, and
Alloy. The focus here is on expressing and proving properties related to the
correct functioning of the fault tolerance mechanism, including consistency, and
correctness of the chosen solution. Performance analysis during the recovery
phase permits to predict how much time and resources are required.
—Coding: A small number of approaches describe (initial) work in supporting the
automated derivation of source code from fault tolerant architectures. This is
due to a number of reasons. Code generation requires a precise and explicit spec-
ification of the system: since only few surveyed approaches provide such a precise
and explicit specification, only those may eventually be used for code generation
purposes (notice that all the approaches supporting code generation support an
explicit SA specification). In general, code generation driven by architectural
specifications is still a fairly explored research area. Among more than fifty ar-
chitectural languages and tools, only Fujaba [Fujaba ], ArchJava [ArchJava ], and
JavaA [Baumeister et al. 2006] support code generation from the specification of
normal (i.e., non fault tolerant) architectures. It is then understandable that
more research and tools are needed in the fault tolerance domain for generating
fault tolerant code from architectural specifications. We believe that only few
approaches are mature enough to be applied in practice.
Two major approaches for code generation are using a specialised middleware
and code generation of Java classes. The proposed middleware is specialised for
targetting arhitectural level recovery by reconfiguration and systematic mapping
of the architectural solution downto its implementation. In the Java code gener-
ation process the model is transformed into a set of application classes supported
by specialised class libraries. All proposals support exception handling.
—Run-time: Many approaches deal with fault tolerant architectures at run-time:
some of them support architectural upgrade (i.e., ensuring fault tolerance of sys-
tem under upgrade by using compensation), some other implement fault handling
by run-time reconfiguration through a middleware support, some focus on run-
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time replacement according to the chosen recovery strategy, and some guarantee
fault tolerance during system reconfiguration.
—FT Software Process: Many approaches are related to architecting fault tolerant
systems during the life cycle. Some of them describe how a fault tolerant archi-
tecture can guide the low-level design process, including one approach describing
how the SA specification can drive the coding process. Only few approaches start
from the requirement specification stage, and only one covers the entire process
from requirements specification to coding. The main focus is either on expressing
exception handling (including the idealised fault tolerant component model and
Coordinated Atomic actions) from the requirement to the design phase, or on
defining specialized architectural styles enforcing exception handling and guiding
the transition to the design.
—FT Style: Considerable number of approaches deal with styles or patterns for
architecting fault tolerant systems. While some of those approaches specifically
propose architectural styles for fault tolerant systems (like the iC2C style and
the idealised fault tolerant style), other approaches employ architectural styles
for meta-level architectures, or focus on creating a bridge between architectural
specifications and low level design using architectural and design patterns. Some
work has been done on introducing co-operative architectural styles for expressing
error recovery involving several components.
—Tool support: Only few approaches are supported by automated tools. Some of
those tools are libraries to be used to implement a fault tolerant system: they
either support a model-driven development, or provide primitives for implement-
ing architectures supporting the idealised fault tolerant component model. Other
approaches allow some form of code generation from architectural specifications
or offer a spesialised middleware supporting run-time architectural reconfigura-
tion. There are tools (LTSA and AEREAL) that are employed for validation of
fault tolerant architectures. Most of those tools, unfortunately, are in a proto-
typal phase or not anymore supported. At the best of our knowledge, only few
tools are still under development and improvement.
Figure 9 summarizes our analysis from the fault tolerance viewpoint.
—Fault assumptions: The assumptions are typically expressed in terms of soft-
ware architecture. The majority of the approaches focus on dealing with various
failures of individual components (these include exceptions propagated by the
components in the situations when they cannot deliver the required service).
There is some earlier work (before 2003) on dealing with software design faults
by employing diverse implementations of components. No approaches directly
deal with faults in the environments - the main reason for this, from our point of
view, is that the typical approach used for dealing with the environment of the
system is by wrapping all sensors or actuators into regular components, so that
failures of those components represent environmental faults.
—Steps of fault tolerance: Several approaches deal with all three steps: error de-
tection, error handling and fault handling. The vast majority of the approaches
support error handling as their main purpose is to ensure that the system contin-
ues provisioning of the service by dealing with errors. Fault handling by recon-
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figuration is a very popular approach as well, this can be explained by the fact
that dealing with system configuration and reconfiguration is a typical concern
addressed at the architectural level, so adding fault handling to this is a very
natural step.
—The origins of the software architecture solution: All the approaches discussed
in the survey originate in the previous work on software-implemented fault tol-
erance. Nearly all major fault tolerance techniques have been moved to the
software architecture domain (recovery blocks, N-version programming, conver-
sation, replication, exception handling). As opposed to the mainstream fault
tolerance only few approaches rely on checkpointing, which is not directly appli-
cable for the COTS components. The role of exception handling is growing at
the architectural level as many researchers realise that this is the most suitable
mechanism for achieving effective recovery during system architecting.
—Error detection: All error detection solutions can be split into two categories.
Some architectural solutions assume that the components themselves detect er-
rors and inform the architectural level (e.g. by raising exceptions). The remain-
ing approaches use additional architectural-level solutions, such as wrappers, glue
code, connectors, monitoring infrastructure.
—Error handling type: Forward error recovery is the predominant solution: the
majority of the approaches use various forms of exception handling for handling
errors. Compensation is quit popular as it can be naturally expressed in terms
of software architectures (e.g. by using diverse or redundant components), and
although it requires considerable component-level redundancy it can clearly be
successfully used at the architectural level. Only one approach supports backward
error recovery.
—Exception handling: In the surveyed approaches exceptions can be raised either
by the individual architectural elements (components or connectors) or by the
dedicated additional software located at the architectural level which detects er-
rors. After exceptions have been raised they can be propagated to and handled
at a number of destinations: individual components or connectors, sets of cooper-
ating components, architectural configurations. To assist in architecting systems
with exception handling many approaches introduce exception handling styles.
These are typically based on either the earlier idea of idealised fault tolerant
component or on the concept of Coordinated Atomic actions.
—Error confinement and recovery domain: The typical approach assumes that er-
rors are confined to individual components (although only few of them explicitly
state this or discuss how to ensure that this assumption holds). In some cases
this allows us to focus architecture recovery only on recovery of individual com-
ponents. This solution works only if we do not need to ensure the consistency of
several interacting components while recovering one of them and when there are
guarantees that erroneous information does not leave the components. Such local
recovery is cheaper than the recovery involving several components but in many
systems in which components are tightly coupled the only possible solution is to
involve in recovery a set of cooperating components. The approaches providing
this often introduce architectural level structuring (e.g. scopes, actions) which
precisely defines the sets of components to be involved in cooperative recovery.
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—Multilevel recovery: The majority of the approaches do not provide multilevel
recovery. The few that do can be categorised into two major groups. The ones
supporting nested structuring following the ideas of Coordinated Atomic actions.
And the ones relying on the layered architecture using the ideas of idealised fault
tolerant component. There are two solutions that do not fell into these groups:
the first one introducing nested subconfigurations and the second one providing
only two level recovery: at the levels of components and actions.
—Fault handling types: The majority of the fault handing mechanisms support
various forms of architectural level reconfiguration that ensures that the faulty
component is removed. This approach fist extremely well into the software archi-
tecture view. Some of the existing solutions extend exception handling with fault
handling functionalities. There are several interesting solutions proposed, includ-
ing, multilevel reconfiguration, definition of reconfiguration policies, introducing
dedicated reconfiguration layer. Unfortunately functionality for conducting fault
diagnostics is explicitly introduced in only few approaches.
—Type of redundancy: A broad variety of redundant resources is used in the ap-
proaches discussed. Each approach uses a special combination of extra com-
ponents, connectors, inter-component links and component interfaces. Many
approaches, for example, employ diverse or replicated components with some ad-
judicating and controlling components. All of the approaches need extra time for
conducting fault tolerance activities.
5.2 Identified Similarities
We are convinced that software architecture and fault tolerance rely on a very
similar set of fundamental needs which are crucial for both of these domains. More-
over, we believe that the work in these two areas, perceived by many as quite
distinct, is in effect driven by similar forces. These include:
—Dealing with system complexity. Managing complexity is in the core of both:
software architecture and fault tolerance. A system cannot be reasoned about
not can fault tolerance be developed without a clear understanding of the system
structuring.
—Effective system structuring. This is in the core of achieving fault tolerance (error
confinement, multilevel recovery), while software architecture is precisely about
system structuring at the earlier development phases.
—Understanding component dependencies. Defining these is crucial for software
architecture and fault tolerance. In the SA community, knowing component
dependencies is especially important for architecture evolution and configuration
[Stafford andWolf 2001]. In fault tolerance, the choice of the appropriate recovery
strategy heavily depends on a clear understanding of error propagation between
components. Both domains strive to reduce the number of dependencies.
—A clear definition of the component interfaces. At the architectural level, in-
terface information is used for system integration and error detection. In the
former case, architectural configurations can be built only when the interfaces
are known. In the latter case, either component interfaces are extended with
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interface exceptions, or interfaces of several components are checked to detect
complex erroneous conditions at the system level.
—Similar modularization criteria. These are applied in constructing complex sys-
tems to ensure their fault tolerance and to improve their architectures [Parnas
1972; Randell 1975; Avizienis 1997]. Both domains aim at developing systems
with fewer inter-component links to make it easy to understand, maintain up-
grade and verify these systems. This includes system functioning in both the
normal and fault tolerance modes. Another reason, specific for fault tolerance, is
that, generally speaking, decreasing the number of inter-component links facilities
system recovery as it allows errors to be contained to smaller recovery domains
(i.e., smaller parts of the system architectures). Keeping information links be-
tween components under control contributes to more efficient fault tolerance and
better system structuring.
—Addressing earlier development phases. Software architecture is always identified
at the earlier development phases. It is becoming clearer for many researchers
working in fault tolerance that to be successful it should be systematically applied
from the earlier development phases [Kaaniche et al. 2002; Romanovsky 2007].
It is interesting to note here that the fault-error-failure chain, which is in the core
of the dependability concepts, is effectively defined in terms of the architectural
elements: a component failure can cause an error which can propagate to the
architectural level boundary and result in system failure. As the last comment
we would like to mention that during this work we have found that there are
some concepts understood by the two communities in a very similar way; the most
important ones being the concepts of components, interfaces and configuration, as
well as the idea of using specialised styles and patterns to help system developers.
5.3 Agenda for Future Research
This section will describe our view of the current and future directions of research
in fault tolerant software architectures.
Service-oriented and Dynamic architecture: Service-Oriented Computing is con-
sidered to be a challenging and promising computing paradigm that utilizes services
as fundamental elements for developing applications. Service-oriented architecture
(SOA) is a component model that links different functional units of an application,
called services, through well-defined interfaces and contracts between them.
One of the defining characteristics of a SOA is its dynamicity. In the dynamic
SA paradigm (usually referred to as DSA), architectures evolve dynamically, either
because the existing components/services are modified, replaced or removed, or
because new components are plugged in (as in, for instance, Service Oriented Ar-
chitectures, publish/subscribe architectures, peer to peer distributed architectures).
These run-time modifications may be due to the need to recover from functional or
performance malfunctions, or may also be the natural consequence of the system
evolution cycle.
In a service oriented architecture, service composition requires dynamic recon-
figuration of services, and the SA, providing the reference model, should allow the
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system to evolve with new components, defining the way in which these can interact
with the existing structure.
There are a growing number of research dealing with fault tolerance in SOA, but
only one of the surveyed approaches explicitly deals with SOA Reference [de Lemos
2005]. Unfortunately the current work is mainly focusing on the design and imple-
mentation phases, or a middleware construction, while not showing how to architect
a fault tolerant SOA system. This area can clearly benefit from introducing reason-
ing at the high level of abstraction. For example, architectural patterns and styles
for designing fault tolerant architectures (see Figure 8, “FT style” column) could
be revised so to fit SOA; dynamically reconfigurable fault tolerant SA approaches
(see Figure 8 and approaches addressing the “Run-time FT” could be adjusted for
dealing with the SOA reconfiguration needs.
Software Product Line architectures: A software product line architecture (SPLA) [Bosch
2000] precisely captures, in a single specification, the overall architecture of a suite
of closely-related products (rather than specifying the architecture of a single soft-
ware system). The techniques for doing so are rooted in the disciplines of SA and
configuration management, and focus on capturing the mandatory elements (which
are present in the architecture of each and every product) and the variation points
(which define the dimensions along which the architectures of the individual prod-
ucts can differ). A single product line architecture may have many variation points
that are often orthogonal to each other: as a result, a considerable number of the
product architectures can be formed by a single product line architecture.
In the context of the current study on fault tolerant SA, the only approach
explicitly referring to “architectures of architectures” is the one presented in Ref-
erence [Guelfi et al. 2004]. Being able to specify and then analyse a FT product
line architecture will enable to improve the dependability of the entire family of
architectures.
Model Driven Architecture and Explicit Resilience: Shifting the focus of software
development from coding to modelling is one of the main achievements of Model-
Driven Architecture [Object Management Group (OMG) 2001] (MDA), which sep-
arates the application logic from the underlying platform technology and gives them
the precise semantic models. Consequently, models are the primary artefacts re-
tained as the first class entities that can be manipulated with using automated
model transformations, in order to move from models to implementation. Soft-
ware Architecture plays a fundamental role in MDA and current research in the
SA community is investing much effort in understanding how to bridge the gap be-
tween requirements and software architecture [Nuseibeh 2001; STRAW Workshop
], and between software architecture and coding [ArchJava ; Baumeister et al. 2006;
Fujaba ].
In the dependability community, the need for explicitly dealing with fault toler-
ance (i.e., resilience) concerns during the entire life cycle has been recently recog-
nised as one of the main approaches to ensuring the overall system dependabil-
ity [Rubira et al. 2005; Kaaniche et al. 2002; ReSIST Project ]. Fault tolerance on-
tologies are being proposed as part of the ReSIST Network of Excellence project [Re-
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SIST Project ] to help in capturing the fault tolerance concerns at each development
step and in bridging the gap between these steps.
Only few of the surveyed approaches deal with model-based specifications of FT
SA and code generation from models (see Figure 8, “Specification” and “Specifi-
cation and Coding” columns), and only Reference [Guelfi et al. 2004] makes an
explicit reference to MDA. Many approaches, instead, cover the topic of fault toler-
ance during the software development process (see Figure 8, “FT Software Process”
column).
Introducing new FT SA approaches explicitly taking into account the MDA prin-
ciples will simplify the specification and analysis of architectures and make the over-
all development more effective by avoiding the usual drift among the architectural
specification and its implementation.
Self-healing systems: Recently there has been growing interest in the areas di-
rectly related and partially overlapping with fault tolerance, such as system self-
healing, self-adaptation and self-management. In all such trends, software-intensive
self-healing systems have an ability of self-managing by adapting at run-time to the
changes which can put the system under danger, including alterations of the re-
source available, dynamically changing user’s needs, system intrusions or faults, and
changes in the system environment. Such a self-healing system must configure and
reconfigure itself, continually tuning and optimizing is own behaviour, protecting
and recovering itself from emerging threats, while keeping its complexity hidden
from the user [SEAMS Workhop ].
While there is clearly research relevant to fault tolerance, the relationship be-
tween fault tolerance and self-healing still requires better understanding. In the
future, self-healing support would allow us to automatically reconfigure the FT ar-
chitecture when abnormal events happen at run-time.
Innovative technologies and tools: Developing advanced technologies and tools
are the most effective way of spinning academic research into practice. However,
while much theoretical research has been focusing on integrating fault tolerance
at the architecture level, not much has been produced in terms of mature tech-
nologies and tools (see Figure 8, “Tool Support” column). In fact, most of the
existing tools are still prototypes and only partially working. New technologies and
tools are needed to allow practitioners to effectively and efficiently deal with fault
tolerance at the various phases of the development process. This should include
developing fully-specified architectural languages explicitly supporting error detec-
tion, error recovery and fault handling, and industrial strength tools enabling the
verification and validation of fault tolerant specific properties. The focus should
be on assessing the achieved level of fault tolerance and evaluating the dependabil-
ity properties of the fault tolerant system. A very promising example of this is
the ongoing work on the Architecture Analysis & Design Language - AADL. This
language was defined by the Society of Automotive Engineers as the aerospace
standard AS5506 [AADL ] and is supported by an Eclipse-based development en-
vironment. Later on it was extended by an Error Model Annex [AADL Annex ] to
be used for specifying various error models of components and connections, as well
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as, the appropriate redundancy management and risk mitigation methods chosen
during system architecturing. These features enable qualitative and quantitative
assessments of system dependability properties such as safety, reliability, integrity,
availability, and maintainability.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The primary object of this survey is to study how current research on architecting
fault tolerant systems allows cross-fertilisation between the software architecture
and fault tolerance communities. Yet since the two communities continue, for
many technical and non-technical reasons, to address specific issues from different
perspectives, the survey starts with analysing the existing approaches using two sets
of disjoint parameters, one to focus on the architecture- and and the second one on
the dependability-specific concepts. This should allow researchers in each domain
to understand more clearly how the approaches used in the other area fit in with
their own investigation. The survey then goes on to draw some conclusions based
on an integrated view, which will contribute to developing a common language that
will enable software architects and fault tolerance experts to work together. We
then provide our personal view, based on the data gathered, of what to expect to
happen in this area in the near future.
While there have been several workshops, tutorials and other events held which
address related issues (References [WADS workshops ; EFTS workshops ; MeMoT
workshop ; Pelliccione et al. 2007; Muccini et al. 2007]), this survey goes much
further by summarising the existing body of work and analysing the major trends
in the area. We hope our work will help to bring the researchers from the two
communities together so that they can come up with even more integrated and
practical solutions.
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Appendix A: Approaches Summary
While Section 4 has provided a parameter by parameter classification of the selected
approaches, this section presents a brief summary of each single approach.
Each subsection will be named according to the following template: <approach
ID> (as defined in Figure 4), <authors>, <event and date>, [reference].
The description will be following this template: keywords, approach goal, and
brief summary. Approaches will be listed based on the order shown in Figure 4;
Figure 7 can instead be used to conceptually organize paper readings in different
orders.
A01] Rivera et al., CMU/SEI TR96 & Sha, IEEESoftw01. [Rivera et al. 1996; Sha 2001;
Gagliardi et al. 1996]
Keywords: software architecture evolution, fault tolerance, monitoring, formal mod-
elling, analytic redundancy;
Approach goal: to introduce the Simplex architecture ensuring system fault toler-
ance and offering a reliable, safe and easy way of upgrading a system while it is in
operation;
Brief summary: Simplex, a software architecture for dependable and evolvable
process-control software-intensive systems, was developed by the CMU/Software
Engineering Institute in mid 90s 7. It provides for (i) dynamic evolution of an ac-
tive system (hardware or software), (ii) toleration of hardware and software faults,
(iiii) a guarantee of the existing level of performance when software fails, (iv) use
of open systems and COTS components, and (v) a support for heterogeneous pro-
gramming languages and hardware. The architecture is developed to satisfy four
main requirements: to make changes reliable and safe, to make changes easier, to
make system development faster and to lower the system cost.
7http://www.sei.cmu.edu/simplex/
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Hardware and software fault tolerance is guaranteed through analytic redundancy
in which two versions, a high-assurance one and a high-performance one, are used
in combination. The high-assurance subsystem ensures simplicity and safety as it
contains a simpler version. The high-performance one can use a COTS component
which provides less reliability but uses more sophisticated controlling algorithm.
Monitoring, analytic redundancy, and Generalized Rate Monotonic Scheduling al-
low for making safer changes. Replacement units makes changes easier. The use
of COTS components enables faster and cheaper development. The Simplex archi-
tecture is specified in WRIGHT to explicitly characterize the connections between
its components at the architectural level, and modelled in CSP, so that the com-
pliance to the selected requirements (such as safety and liveness) are proved using
the FDR model checker. The architecture was successfully employed in developing
a Plasma Enhanced-Controlled Vapor Deposition Apparatus used for the devel-
opment of improved semiconductor production software and techniques, and an
autopilot upgrade to an F-16 simulator.
A02] CookDage, ICSE99. [Cook and Dage 1999]
Keywords: component-based systems, dynamic component level upgrade, fault tol-
erance during upgrade, versions (releases) of the components, component diversity,
N-version programming, majority voting;
Approach goal: to ensure fault tolerance of system under upgrade by connecting and
monitoring the behaviour of the old and new releases of off-the-shelves components;
Brief summary: the paper proposes the Hercules framework, which keeps multiple
versions of the same component running and uses this diversity to ensure system
reliability during both execution and upgrade. The framework is used under an as-
sumption that each new version performs all functionality of the component but, at
the same time, it is specifically developed to behave correctly in the specific domain
where the existing (previous) version fails. For each invocation of a component all
its versions are run in parallel and the results are collected by an Arbiter component.
The Arbiter selects the correct results with the help of the Constraint Evaluator
component which analyses the version outputs, version states and the specifica-
tions of the version specific domains, given in the form of domain constraints. This
component analyses the version constraints relationships as new versions can be
developed as improvements of several existing versions. By logging the results of
versions and of the voting it is possible to decide when the new version is more
reliable than the old one and completely replace and remove the old version.
A03] Issarny and Banatre, HICSS01. [Issarny and Banatre 2001]
Keywords: exception handling, configuration exceptions, dynamic reconfiguration,
middleware;
Approach goal: to complement at the architectural level the exception handling
implemented within components and connectors;
Brief summary: there are two major exception handling strategies for dealing
with exceptions at the software architecture level: exception handling implemented
within components and connectors, and configuration exceptions. Component- and
connector-level exception handling permits to catch and handle exceptions internal
to a certain component or connector. Such exceptions do not impact on the overall
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architecture. Architecture-level exception handling, also called configuration excep-
tions, instead, requires the cooperation of many components in the architecture in
order to handle the exception. The paper describes how to extend an architecture
specification by introducing a configuration exception specification and handler:
while the configuration exception specification describes the conditions upon the
system state that lead to exceptions occurrences, the handlers specify required run-
time changes to the current configurations. Nested areas of recovery are supported
by introducing sub-configurations. The Aster environment is presented, aiming
at providing an implementation-level support for architecture reconfiguration and
exceptional event monitoring, via a middleware architecture.
A04] Beder et al., ISORC01. [Beder et al. 2001]
Keywords: architectural styles for FT (Idealized FT component model style, role-
based collaboration style), patterns for object-oriented design of FT systems, coor-
dinated atomic actions;
Approach goal: incorporate error recovery at the architectural level by combined
application of different architectural styles and design patterns;
Brief summary: the goal of this paper is to produce a software architecture for
dependable systems, based on two different architectural styles: the idealized fault
tolerant component style and the role-based collaboration style. The first style is
a specialisation of the Shaw’s and Garlan’s layered style, which uses a special type
of the connectors. The second style is a specialised style based on the role-based
collaboration style by Van Hilst and Notkin. The two styles proposed are applied
independently as they deal with the different (orthogonal) concerns. After the
production of the dependable architecture, a set of design patterns are applied in
order to refine the dependable architecture elements, bridging the transition from
architectural design to coding.
A05] Garcia and Rubira, BC AEHT01. [Garcia and Rubira 2001]
Keywords: exception handling from architectural design to detailed design, design
patterns;
Approach goal: to provide a systematic approach for incorporating exception han-
dling from the architectural design stage to the detailed design stage;
Brief summary: this paper presents an exception handling model and a systematic
approach for incorporating exception handling from architectural design to detailed
design. At the architectural design level, reflection is used to distinguish a meta-
level architecture from the architecture. The architectural model designed at this
level considers both sequential and concurrent exception handling. Four different
components are identified: the exception, handler, exception handling strategy and
concurrent exception handling action. They are used respectively for for specifying,
raising, handling and resolving exceptions. Given the architectural model, architec-
tural refinement is applied at two levels; the base and the meta (through reflection),
and design patterns are proposed in order to refine the general components of the
proposed architecture. A design pattern is associated to any architectural compo-
nent.
A06] Romanovsky, COMPSAC01. [Romanovsky 2001]
Keywords: component-based systems, integration, exception handling, coordinated
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atomic actions, COTS components;
Approach goal: to develop an exception handling framework suitable for component-
based system development by applying general exception handling mechanisms used
in distributed systems and programming languages;
Brief summary: component-based software (CBS) development needs a more disci-
plined approach to exception handling, than the software developed from scratch,
due to several reasons: CBS is typically very complex with a big variety of un-
expected situations which can happen; moreover, the components (including the
off-the-shelves ones) may not fit the context in which they are used or may be un-
reliable. The paper proposes a three steps framework for systematic integration of
exception handling during system integration of component-based systems. In this
approach the components are wrapped in order to detect and handle local excep-
tions and to propagate the global ones. The integrated system is structured into
coordinated atomic actions dictating how multiple components can work together
for the system-level cooperative exception handling.
A07] Rakic et al., SSR01. [Rakic and Medvidovic 2001]
Keywords: off-the-shelves components, system upgrading, software diversity, com-
pensation, architectural undo, fault tolerance during system upgrade, dynamic re-
configuration, multi-version connectors;
Approach goal: to ensure fault tolerance of system under upgrade by dynamically
connecting and monitoring the behaviour of the old and new releases of off-the-
shelves components;
Brief summary: this paper proposes a SA approach for ensuring fault tolerance
of the systems composed using legacy components. Such systems need to be up-
graded by replacing older version of the components with the new ones. The ap-
proach proposed relies on dynamic connection of several versions of a component
and employing the natural diversity this composition provides to ensure system
fault tolerance.
A specialised Multi-Version Connector (MVC) is used to monitor the execution
of several versions, to collect the history of version execution and to dynamically
remove less reliable versions or replace the old version with the new one. Each
call of the component is transformed by MVC into concurrent calls of all available
versions, the result of the only one (the most trusted) are transformed back to the
callee. MVC can save and restore the intermediate states of the versions to move,
if necessary, the state of all versions back (providing an architectural undo). MVC
allows component versions to be dynamically inserted and removed.
The proposed implementation of MVC as a wrapper uses the C2 architectural
style. The approach is demonstrated using a word processor application.
A08] LiuRichardson, WADS02. [Liu and Richardson 2003]
Keywords: component replication and replacement, component failure detection
and recovery, reconfiguration, just-in-time component testing, architectural style,
component diversity, redundancy, result adjudication;
Approach goal: to develop a redundant component array technology to be used
for fault-tolerance, result refinement and performance enhancement purposes; to
allow various levels of component redundancy (diversity); to enable flexible adju-
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dication of the component results; to propose an architectural style supporting the
technology used at the architectural level;
Brief summary: the paper presents the RAIC (redundant arrays of independent
components) as an approach to achieve higher dependability and to improving
desirable properties of the component-based systems. The main idea is to store
components with similar characteristics (thus replaceable) in a redundant array.
Whenever required from the application, components in a RAIC can be dynamically
added or removed. A RAIC controller handles the dynamic update of components,
in order to optimize selected qualities. If necessary it initiates updating of the new
component state to make it identical to the states of running components. The
RAIC controller can execute components in one of the three modes: sequentially,
synchronously or asynchronously in parallel. The controller adjudicates the results
received from the array components by using just-in-time component testing.
Redundant components are integrated into an array following a number of con-
figuration strategies, which support different degrees of component diversity.
The approach is presented at the architectural level as a RAIC architectural style
linking redundant components and the controller through architectural configura-
tion and reconfiguration.
A09] deLemos, ICSM01 & deLemos, JSS02. [de Lemos 2001; 2004]
Keywords: architectural style, architectural mismatch, architectural evolution, co-
operative recovery, COTS components;
Approach goal: to introduce a co-operative architectural style for modelling and
analysing fault tolerant evolving software systems built from the commercial off-
the-shelves (COTS) components. In this style, a specialised connector is defined to
capture the collaborative behaviour of components;
Brief summary: different software systems can be created or be evolved by compos-
ing in different ways the COTS components, which being usually black box cannot
be changed. Thus, interaction becomes more important than the components them-
selves. By using the proposed co-operative architectural style, the evolution of the
software system can be handled by adapting the interaction between components
through co-operative connectors, which restrict the impact of change. Moreover,
in the proposed approach system-level exceptions are handled at the level of com-
ponent coordination as well. The main goal is thus to obtain a dependable system
by creating dependable services from untrustworthy components. Safety analysis
of the normal and abnormal system behaviour is conducted over the co-operative
architecture by using timed automata and the UPPAAL model checker. The ap-
proach is demonstrated by modelling a destruction system of the VS-40X sounding
rocket.
A010] de Lemos et al., WADS 02 & deLemos et al., BC ADS(I)03. [de Lemos et al.
2002; 2003]
Keywords: architectural mismatch tolerance, component interaction, runtime;
Approach goal: to use general principles of fault tolerance to tolerate architectural
mismatches;
Brief summary: an architectural mismatch is an inconsistency between various con-
straints imposed by different architectural elements. It occurs when a component
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makes certain assumptions about other components, and such assumptions do not
match. While typical approaches analyze and remove mismatches through static
analysis, the presented approach proposes to treat mismatches which are left in the
system as faults and to tolerate them using error detection and system recovery.
Similarly to what is done when applying fault tolerance, the architectural mismatch
tolerance requires to prevent propagation of errors caused by mismatch (ECM), to
facilitate ECM detection and recovery, and to prevent the architectural mismatch
from reactivating. The mismatch tolerance process is introduced and demonstrated
through a series of examples. The proposed approach treats differently application-
specific and style-specific mismatches. The paper discusses several possible ways of
introducing redundant information and architectural elements to support mismatch
tolerance.
A11] Guelfi et al., GPCE04. [Guelfi et al. 2004]
Keywords: MDE and model transformation, Coordinated Atomic (CA) Actions,
from SA to Java coding of distributed complex fault tolerant systems, error recov-
ery;
Approach goal: to present an MDE/MDA development method based on CA Ac-
tions;
Brief summary: the goal of the CORRECT project8 is to support rigorous step-
wise development of complex fault tolerant distributed systems. The CORRECT
methodology aims to cover several phases of the software life-cycle, including soft-
ware architecture design and implementation. The Model Driven Engineering
method proposed is intended to generate, by model transformation, reliable Java
code. The concept of CA Actions, supporting backward and forward error recovery,
distributed transactions and atomic actions is used as part of the proposed DRIP
Catalyst development method. This method includes an MDE process, a UML-
based notation (a profile for modelling CA actions) and an MDA development
support tool. The process proposed consists of several phases, including platform-
independent architectural and detailed design. The paper reports on experimental
evaluation of the proposed development method.
A12] Alda and Cremers, CBSE04. [Alda and Cremers 2004]
Keywords: self-adaptation, P2P architectures, exception handling;
Approach goal: to demonstrate how component technology, and specifically component-
based architectures, can be used for creating self-adaptable peer-to-peer architec-
tures which rely on the error detection and exception handling at the architectural
level;
Brief summary: the interaction among components, in a software architecture
model, may yield to syntactic or semantic dependencies between them. When a
dependency is violated, an exception occur, and if not correctly handled, it can give
rise to system-level misbehaviour. This paper introduces DeEvolve, a component-
based self-adaptable P2P architecture which extends the traditional concept of
adaptation by accomplishing explicit error detection and exception handling at
the architectural level. In this architecture, exceptions and exception handlers are
defined during peer service composition. These exceptions typically represent er-
8http://se2c.uni.lu/tiki/tiki-index.php?page=CorrectOverview
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roneous events at the system level (such as failure of services, timeouts and loss
of access rights). The main recovery strategies supported by this architecture are
changing the attributes of individual components, changing connections between
components and reconfiguring the system. The paper deals with the self-adaptation
which is directly related to system recovery at the architectural level following de-
tection of the potentially damaging events (errors).
A13] Porcarelli et al., BC ADS(II)04. [Porcarelli et al. 2004]
Keywords: reconfiguration-based architectural-level fault tolerance, fault handling
strategies, monitoring, component-based applications, black box components;
Approach goal: to introduce a framework for reconfiguration-based fault tolerance
in distributed systems;
Brief summary: this paper proposes a framework for fault tolerance provision in
distributed applications, created by assembling COTS items. The framework is
applied in three phases: monitoring, decision process, reconfiguration. Through
monitoring, critical events (including system errors and component failures) are
identified. The decision process, performed by a Decision Maker, chooses the new
configuration capable of dealing with the identified fault. The reconfiguration phase
changes the configuration of the component-based system according to the decision
process. The framework implementing the proposed approach builds on the Lira
infrastructure (an infrastructure for component-based systems reconfiguration), en-
riched with decision making capabilities. Lira performs monitoring and reconfigu-
ration at the component and architectural levels by employing a set of specialised
agents. The Decision Maker dynamically evaluates possible reconfiguration strate-
gies using simplified Stochastic Petri Nets models, capturing various failure modes
of the individual components: crash, value and Byzantine.
A14] Bondavalli et al., IEEE TDSC04. [Bondavalli et al. 2004]
Keywords: COTS systems, architectural framework, replication, majority voting,
fault masking, damage assessment, fault handling, fault treatment and system re-
configuration;
Approach goal: to propose a methodology and an architectural framework for han-
dling multiple classes of faults in a COTS- and Legacy-based application. The
approach is based on fault-treatment, instead of error handling, and relies on a
three-tier architectural style;
Brief summary: this paper describes an architectural framework supporting fault
tolerance through error detection, damage assessment, error recovery and fault
treatment. The framework builds on the idea that accurate fault diagnosis enables
effective fault treatment actions, and as such plays a key role in further improvement
the dependability of COTS- and Legacy-based applications.
The proposed architecture is distributed into three tiers: a client tier (which
uses the services provided by the third tier), a middle tier (in charge of handling
distribution and fault tolerance related activities), and a third tier (consisting of
a replicated COTS- and Legacy-based application). The architectural framework
supports handling of multiple classes of faults: hardware-induced software errors in
application, process and/or host crashes or hangs, and errors in persistent stable
storage. In this framework, COTS component replication and majority voting on
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the results are used for error detection and masking. The diagnostic features assess
component status over some period of time to identify the damage and the need for
recovery, reconfiguration and treatment actions. Three types of recovery actions
can be carried out, depending on the perceived severity of the faults: application
restart, reboot of the host computer and DB restore using multiple copies. Fault
tolerance modelling is conducted using Stochastic Petri Nets.
The general architecture is instantiated to a case study application in which a
legacy component consisting of legacy code written in C, uses a COTS DBMS,
namely PostgreSQL for stable storage facilities. This work starts with the Fail-
ure Mode Error Analysis and fault injection helping to clearly identify the fault
assumptions specific for the case study.
A15] DasWoodside, BC ADS(II)04. [Das and Woodside 2004]
Keywords: performability model, fault tolerant distributed applications, combined
evaluation of performance and dependability attributes, individual component fail-
ures and repairs, redundancy policies, operational reconfiguration, availability man-
agement architecture, fault propagation graph, system recovery;
Approach goal: the paper introduces the Dependable-LQNmodel (already described
elsewhere) and shows how it can profitably work when dealing with real complex
systems; the essence of the specification is in modelling layered software architec-
tures extended with the dedicated availability management architecture;
Brief summary: the Dependable-LQN model is a performance and dependability
model for fault tolerant applications with layered architectures extended with the
dedicated availability management architecture. The model combines two parts:
a Fault-Tolerant Layered Queueing Network (FTLQN) sub-model for describing
the layered software architecture, and a Model for Availability Management Ar-
chitecture (MAMA) sub-model for describing the fault management architecture.
The FTLQN model extends the Layered Queueing Network (LQN) performance
model by specifying the strategies to be used in case of component failures and by
adding redundant components and availability related parameters to it. It supports
three redundancy policies: Primary-Standby Redundancy, Active Redundancy and
Load-Balanced Redundancy.
The MAMAmodel describes fault management architectures based on the manager-
agent model introduced elsewhere. This model considers four types of components
(application task, agent task, manager task and processor) connected using three
types of connectors (alive-watch, status-watch and notify connectors). The man-
agement architecture influences the fault coverage of the system (i.e. its ability to
recover). The management subsystem is responsible for operational configuration
of the redundant components.
Towards a six phases approach, the Dependable-LQN model can be elaborated
and solved in order to obtain performance measures. The model works under
assumptions that individual components fail and are repaired independently.
The Dependable-LQN model is applied over an Air Traffic Control architecture
and numerical results are collected.
A16] Laibinis and Troubitsyna, SEFM04. [Laibinis and Troubitsyna 2004]
Keywords: layered architectures, correctness by construction, B method, refine-
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ment, fault tolerance, exception handling, exceptions and handlers at each layer,
exception propagation, component-level error detection, specification pattern for
exception raising and handling, exception handling in the development process;
Approach goal: to propose a specification pattern that can be recursively applied to
formally specify and build a layered fault tolerant system consisting of fault tolerant
components;
Brief summary: this paper deals with layered architectures and propose a formal
specification pattern that can be recursively applied to formally specify exception
raising and handling at each architectural layer. The exception handling is chosen
as the most general mechanism for ensuring system fault tolerance, although this
paper focuses specifically on hardware faults and human errors. The assumption is
that errors are detected by the components and either dealt with at the component
level or propagated to the components of the higher level.
The specification pattern proposed enforces development of the fault tolerant
components as the building blocks of the fault tolerant layered architecture. In
particular, this pattern extends any component with the ability to catch and handle
exceptions and recover component, as well as with the means for dealing in a
different way with the exceptions that are generated by the component itself or
propagated from other components.
The layered system is specified through the formal B method: thorough stepwise
refinements, abstract specifications are refined so to smoothly incorporate reasoning
about fault tolerance into the software development process. The process results
in the development of fault tolerant layered systems correct by construction. The
approach has been applied to a real-life control system: the liquid handling work-
station Fillwell.
A17] Guerra et. al., WADS02 & Castor Filho et. al., WADS03 & Castor Filho
et. al., LADC03 & Guerra et al., ESEC/FSE03 & Guerra et al., BC ADS(II)04.
[de C. Guerra et al. 2002; de Lima Filho et al. 2003; Filho et al. 2003; de C. Guerra et al. 2003; 2004]
Keywords: iC2C, FaTC2, iCOTS, COTS components, C2 style, Idealized Fault
Tolerant Component model, Exception Handling, Component-based system;
Approach goal: to present an exception handling approach which adds fault tol-
erance to component-based systems at the architectural level. In this approach,
the Idealized Fault Tolerant Component model is integrated with the C2 style, in
order to produce an Idealized C2 Component model (the iC2C style). The FaTC2
framework is introduced to support the Idealized C2 Component model. The iC2C
style is further specialised to support protective wrapping at the architectural level;
Brief summary: the C2 architectural style [C2 Style ] was introduced some time
ago as a particular architectural style, where components and connectors are con-
nected according to certain rules supporting integration of the COTS components.
The Idealized Fault Tolerant Component Model (IFTCM) [Lee and Anderson 1990]
defines a design blueprint which makes a clear separation between normal and ex-
ceptional component behaviour. The authors extend the C2 architectural style
with information required for representing IFTCM (including new types of mes-
sages), decouple normal component activity from the abnormal one and introduce
specialised C2 connectors, thus proposing an idealized C2 fault tolerant component
model (iC2C). The style supports both multilevel system structuring and multilevel
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exception propagation. Paper [de C. Guerra et al. 2003] introduces a development
guideline for transforming a COTS item into an iC2C architectural element.
The FaTC2 framework implements the iC2C presented in [de C. Guerra et al.
2002]. The FaTC2 framework consists of a library of Java classes, created to extend
the C2 framework in order to introduce a forward error recovery mechanism. While
the user implements the normal and abnormal activities, connections between nor-
mal/abnormal parts are managed directly by the FaTC2 framework.
ALEx is an exception handling mechanism which, following the Idealized C2
Component model presented in [de C. Guerra et al. 2002], allows exception repre-
sentation, handler definition, handler attachment, exception propagation, handler
search and continuation of the execution after handling.
The iC2C style is specialised to produce an iCOTS style supporting protective
wrapping (error detection and exception handling) of the legacy component [de C. Guerra
et al. 2003; 2004]. A protective wrapper is a special type of application-specific
fault-tolerance capability. Following the style proposed protective wrappers are
integrated in the architectural configuration as a set of new architectural elements.
A18] Feng et al., SEM05. [Feng et al. 2005]
Keywords: exception handling during component composition, architectural level
exception handling, compile-time and run-time exception handling, middleware
support;
Approach goal: to develop an exception handling solution which is specified at the
architecture-level and validated at run-time through middleware support;
Brief summary: the paper presents initial work to build an exception handling
model, and to enforce it at run-time through middleware support. An exception
handling model is defined which is complementary to the software architecture and
as such defines a new architectural view. This model supports explicit descrip-
tion of exceptions and handling strategies at the level of component composition.
In particular, it supports definition of induced failures and induced exceptions to
involve several interlinked components into handling of an exception. Handling
strategies can be of very wide types, including use of component replicas, reboot,
component replacement, etc. A specialised middleware is introduced to monitor the
occurrence of exceptions and to handle them according to the exception handling
model defined.
The paper outlines a process for dealing with exceptions starting with defining
a SA without taking into consideration any exceptions, continuing with identifying
exceptions which individual components can face and handle, and finishing with
defining exception handling strategies for the rest of exceptions. The main assump-
tion under which this approach works and which seems to be very reasonable, is
that the system integrator has enough information about the exceptional behaviour
of individual components and interlinks between composed components.
A19] Ferreira et. al., HASE01 & Rubira et. al., SP&E05 & Brito et. al,
LADC05. [Ferreira et al. 2001; Rubira et al. 2005; da S. Brito et al. 2005]
Keywords: exception handling, error recovery, exceptions in component-based sys-
tems, component collaboration, from fault tolerance requirements to fault toler-
ant implementations, Catalysis process, idealized fault-tolerant component model,
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UML Component process;
Approach goal: to incorporate exceptional behaviour in the development of component-
based systems, and to introduce the MDCE+ (Methodology for the Definition of
Exception Behavior) methodology;
Brief summary: the papers propose a systematic approach to incorporating excep-
tion handling in all phases of software development, from requirement to implemen-
tation. The approach extends the Catalysis process and is strongly centered around
the concept of collaboration among elements. Use case diagrams are extended to
represent exceptional behaviour and used for driving the fault tolerance component
specification, design and implementation.
At the architecture level, the idealized fault tolerant component model style is
utilised to produce a fault tolerant SA. After specifying the components, the three
steps of component design are conducted: architecture design, collaboration design
and internal design. Component collaborations are defined with the exceptional
behaviour associated with them.
At the end of the development, during the implementation phase, the low level
design is turned into Java classes, by using a meta-object protocol (MOP) proposed
elsewhere. The components are implemented in the base level while the meta-
objects implement the specific responsibilities of the exception mechanism.
The approach initially proposed in [Ferreira et al. 2001] and further developed
in [Rubira et al. 2005], has been extended in [da S. Brito et al. 2005] in order to deal
with unit testing to be run in parallel to the development phases. The MDCE+
methodology is proposed for defining and unit testing the exceptional activity of
component-based software systems.
A20] Parchas and deLemos, WADS04 & deLemos, BC ADS(III)05. [Parchas and
de Lemos 2004; de Lemos 2005]
Keywords: Web services, architectural pattern, reconfiguration, application-independent
fault tolerance by error detection, compensation and fault handling, redundant com-
ponents, self-checking pair, dynamic reconfiguration;
Approach goal: to improve the availability and correctness of Web service applica-
tion by using an architectural approach for incorporating fault tolerance based on
redundant services;
Brief summary: this paper demonstrates how application-independent fault toler-
ance techniques (such us self-checking pair and reconfiguration) can be incorpo-
rated in the fault tolerance architectures via a pattern. The proposed pattern relies
on two main principles: components implementing a crash-failure semantics and
system support for dynamic reconfiguration. This pattern provides available and
correct access to redundant sources of information (Web services). The sources
of information are developed independently by different service providers and in-
tegrated together using the proposed pattern, which deals with the architectural
elements of four types: Bridge, Comparator, Service Broker and FT Registry, and
captures the main functionalities specific for dynamic composition of Web services.
In particular, the Bridge element deals with potential mismatches between different
sources of information providing the same or similar functionalities. The Compara-
tor implements crash-failure semantics by comparing information from two sources
and crashing when the results differ. In this case the system looks up for another
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Comparator and another Bridge connected to two redundant sources of informa-
tion. The Service Broker evaluates the quality of alternative web services. The
FT Registry supports architectural reconfiguration when a Comparator crash-fails.
The approach relies on availability of diversely-implemented sources of information,
Comparators and Bridges. It is demonstrated by developing a case study ensuring
continuous correct provision of stock quotes.
A21] deLemos, SEAMS06. [de Lemos 2006a]
Keywords: architectural reconfiguration for fault handling, Coordinated atomic
actions, exception handling, fault tolerance during reconfiguration;
Approach goal: to describe how coordinated atomic actions and exception handling
can be applied to ensure fault handling during architectural reconfiguration;
Brief summary: to implement fault handling (i.e. to rid the system from a fault) as
a part of fault tolerance we often need to change the architecture (i.e., to reconfig-
ure it). During this step architectural elements can be added, removed or replaced;
the overall configuration can be changed. The paper proposes to structure reconfig-
uration activities using Coordinated Atomic actions fault handling capabilities, so
to achieve a clear separation of the application and reconfiguration activities. Ar-
chitectural elements (connectors and components) are created in order to explicitly
maintain this separation by providing two interfaces, Application and Configura-
tion, according to the peer-to-peer architectural style developed by P. Clements
et al. [Clements et al. 2002]. For the purpose of establishing configuration and
reconfiguration, a Coordinated Atomic action is incorporated into the definition of
an architectural connector. Coordinated atomic actions are proved to be a suit-
able mechanism for architectural reconfiguration as this activity typically involves
several cooperating components and needs to be fault tolerant.
A22] MageeMaibaum, SEAMS06. [Magee and Maibaum 2006]
Keywords: fault tolerance modelling, self-healing, fault handling by dynamic re-
configuration, formal SA specification and checking, Labelled Transition System
Analyzer (LTSA), Finite State Processes (FSP), tool support;
Approach goal: To extend the approach and formalism proposed in [Aguirre and
Maibaum 2003] for specifying and reasoning about dynamically-reconfigurable, multi
component systems with mechanisms for specifying normal and abnormal behaviour,
and recovery actions (fault handling) by reconfiguration;
Brief summary: in the Modal Action Logic (MAL) specification language, a compo-
nent is described in terms of attributes, actions and axioms. MAL can be used for
specifying normal and abnormal states and behaviour. This paper analyses how a
MAL specification can be systematically translated into finite state models, by ex-
tending the LTSA approach and the FSP algebra. This finite state model specifies
both normal and abnormal behaviour and can be successively used for automated
verification of the fault tolerance properties and of the effectiveness of the fault
tolerance models. The focus here is on modelling and analysing fault handling con-
ducted by dynamic system reconfiguration. The ideas proposed are demonstrated
using a simple case study in which master server fails over to a slave sever.
A23] Bucchiarone et al., VODCA06. [Bucchiarone et al. 2006]
Keywords: architectural level fault tolerance, fault tolerance model-based testing,
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process, fault tolerance requirements, idealized fault tolerant component model,
exception handling, UML, component-based systems;
Approach goal: to complement, at the architectural level, fault tolerance with fault
removal techniques in order to reduce the number and severity of all unexpected
faults and to ensure the correctness of fault tolerance means;
Brief summary: the main goal of this paper is to propose a comprehensive approach
for developing and validating component-based systems according to fault tolerance
requirements.
The approach starts with requirement analysis and elicitation in order to identify
critical services (those to be maintained during faults or attacks). During this
analysis, a number of fault scenarios is selected and the corresponding use cases are
specified.
At the second step, fault tolerance decisions are taken and a fault tolerant
component-based software architecture (CBSA) model, based on the idealized fault
tolerant model and on clear separation of the component normal and abnormal (ex-
ceptional) behaviour, is realised in order to meet the fault tolerance requirements.
The fault tolerant architecture proposed consists of structural and behavioural spec-
ifications. The structural part is specified using an extended UML notation.
Finally, test case specifications are extracted from the CBSA specification to
validate the implementation adherence to the fault tolerance requirements. The
tests are specifically selected to cover faulty situations. The specification of the
exceptional behaviour in the CBSA model acts as an oracle.
A24] deLemos et al., IEEESoftw06 & deLemos, WADS06. [de Lemos et al. 2006; de Lemos
2006b]
Keywords: exception handling, idealized fault tolerant architectural component,
idealized fault tolerant architectural connector, idealized fault tolerant architectural
style, peer-to-peer architectural style;
Approach goal: to architect dependable systems from existing undependable compo-
nents and/or systems, such as off-the-shelf (OTS) components and legacy systems,
that were not originally designed to interact with each other;
Brief summary: the approach presented in the paper, following the ideas of the Ide-
alized FT component model, introduces the Idealised FT architectural component
(iFTComponent), the Idealised FT architectural connector (iFTConnector), and in
general, the Idealized FT architectural element (iFTE). These elements are defined
as a specialisation of the peer-to-peer architectural style defined by P. Clements et
al. in [Clements et al. 2002] in the context of the request/reply interactions. iFTE
is a style which defines external interfaces of the iFTE element and internal inter-
faces prescribing how components and connectors inside this iFTE are integrated.
The iFTE includes mechanisms for detecting errors, raising and handling internal
exceptions, and handling exceptions raised externally by other elements. The iFTE
inherits the basic principles from the idealized fault tolerant component model, but
can be instantiated to both idealized FT components and connectors. Each ele-
ment in the iFTE has four interfaces (two for handling exceptional behaviour and
two for normal behaviour) and consists in its turn from four main architectural
elements (two components for handling Normal and Abnormal situations and two
connectors for handling exceptional conditions related to the normal and abnormal
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components). The iFTE connectors can support propagation of an exception to a
set of collaborating components.
A25] CastorFilho et al., WADS05 & CastorFilho et al., REFT05 & CastorFilho
et al., JSS06 & CastorFilho et al., BC REFT06. [Filho et al. 2005b; 2005a; Filho et al. 2006b;
2006a]
Keywords: exception handling, exception flow architectural view, exception flow
connectors, verification of the exception flow properties, the Aereal framework,
ACME, Alloy, exceptional style;
Approach goal: to integrate an ACME specification with exceptional information,
to compose the two views and eventually applying Alloy to check the FT SA model;
Brief summary: the approach introduces Aereal, a framework for extending archi-
tectural descriptions with information about exceptions. The software architecture
is specified in ACME, the exceptional flow between architectural elements are cap-
tured in an Exception Flow model (using an exceptional style). This model, part
of the Aereal framework, allows developers to rigorously specify common rules of
exception handling systems. A detailed description of the model is given in [Filho
et al. 2006a]. The ACME specification is composed from the exception flow view,
from which an Alloy model is generated for analysing exception flows. In the
proposed software architectural model special-purpose architectural connectors are
used to model exception flow between components. These connectors, called excep-
tion ducts, are unidirectional point-to-point links through which only exceptions
flow. They are orthogonal to normal architectural connectors and do not constrain
the way in which the architecture is organized. The architectural view consists of
components which catch and/or signal exceptions and exception ducts, architec-
tural elements representing flow of exceptions between two components. Two case
studies (the Mining control system and the Financial system) have been used for
evaluation this approach in [Filho et al. 2006b].
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Fig. 9. The FT viewpoint
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